2024 US Elections: Implications for the Middle East
ABOUT THE ROUNDTABLE
Last month, Fiker Institute & the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for American Studies and Research at the American University in Cairo hosted a joint Policy Roundtable on the upcoming 2024 US elections & the potential implications on the Middle East. With a few months till the US chooses its next president, the closed session gathered academics, fellows, & researchers to debate the political, economic, and strategic dimensions of a new American administration in November.
Fiker Institute’s partnership with the Prince AlWaleed Bin Talal AlSaud Center falls under the umbrella of its regional research programs, which aim to serve as a platform to navigate the complexities of inter-regional relations in the years ahead.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
During the Roundtable, experts engaged in three intensive sessions, each dissecting critical dimensions of the region’s future under distinct US electoral outcomes. The first session, dedicated to Military & Defense Implications, projected scenarios under a Republican and Democratic administration, contemplating shifts in US military strategy and defense policies across the Middle East. Participants further underscored the continuity in international relations and military affairs across US administrations. The conversations conducted during the second session, which centered on Political & Economic Implications, mainly focused on the Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt, and the potential impacts on political stability and economic partnerships under differing US leadership. In particular, participants discussed contrasting trajectories under distinct electoral outcomes on key priorities including foreign aid, human rights, economic engagement, and foreign policy alliances. The Roundtable wrapped up with the third session, Security & Proxy implications, which emphasized the ongoing challenges towards US policy in the Middle East vis-à-vis Iran, Syria, and Yemen. The discussions focused on the potential effects on regional stability and proxy conflicts under different US foreign policy measures. Overall, the sessions highlighted the sensitivity of ongoing regional dynamics to future American foreign policy, emphasizing the need for adaptable approaches to existing realities. The Roundtable was crucial in not only mapping the landscape of conflict and stability in the Middle East, but also in serving as a catalyst for debates on much-needed inter-regional cooperation.
KEY DISCUSSION POINTS
Session I: Military & Defense Implications
• While US presidential decisions and initiatives shape foreign policy trajectories, the American political system, through Congress, the Department of State, and the Pentagon, nevertheless condition these outcomes, ensuring a certain degree of continuity in international relations and military affairs from one administration to the next. Consequently, policies often mirror broader, bi-partisan strategic goals that transcend individual administrations, and they also reflect the checks and balances imposed by the constitutional order and press. While Western international opinion tends to view a second Trump term as being unpredictable, and the potential reelection of a Democratic candidate as more stable, both scenarios would encounter significant challenges in maintaining consistency of strategy and narratives, while still addressing the evolving geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Professor William Gueraiche argues that arms contracts will remain a cornerstone in discussions on security issues, and therefore, one cannot say that the United States has lost its influence in the region, but it has lost certain forms of influence.
• President Biden stepping down in favor of Vice President Kamala Harris further complicates the coherence of the country’s short and medium-term military and defense goals, particularly given Harris’ lack of a track record in foreign affairs, security, and defense. Professor James Lockhart notes that in these domains, Harris remains far less known, and consequently less predictable, than Biden or Trump, and that she doesn’t have the same reviewable record that they do in these sectors.
• Moreover, future military and defense issues in the Middle East cannot be seen in isolation from the regional legacy of the last quarter of a century, where the Bush and Obama administrations, responding to the 9/11 attacks, launched and continued to prosecute wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and then subsequently ‘pivoted’ away towards the Indo-Pacific, choosing to give more attention to a resurging great-power rivalry with Russia and China. This relative withdrawal from the region has, in different degrees, continued to unfold over the last eight years under both Trump and Biden’s leadership, but it has manifested in different ways. Despite intentions to move away from the Middle East, American presidents have been repeatedly drawn back into its conflicts, from the civil war in Syria to, most recently, the Israel-Gaza war and the maritime threats in the Red Sea. Additionally, the emergence of China’s mediating role between Saudi Arabia and Iran has highlighted a new international dimension in the region’s diversified diplomatic landscape by challenging American preeminence and prompting strategic recalculations from all sides.
• In terms of the US relationship with Arab countries, especially in the Arabian Gulf, strong bilateral defense relationships will persist, albeit in varying degrees under either a Democratic or Republican White House. The commitment to defend Saudi interests and the broader stability of the region remains a cornerstone of US policy, as indeed, the Saudi-American relationship dates to the 1930s, irrespective of statements made by Presidential candidates during campaign seasons, as has been the case with previous election cycles. Further, a Saudi-American security agreement is expected to take shape with or without any prerequisite of Saudi-Israeli normalization, although it seems likely to happen faster under a second Trump administration than another Democratic term.
• Regarding the Israel-Gaza war, since 1948, both Republican and Democratic administrations have maintained strong support for Israel, despite differences in approach and public opinion within their respective parties, including today’s vocal opposition across the Democratic base and throughout universities. We could be witnessing a generational shift within the domestic American landscape that is worth noting, with younger Democrats pushing for less support for Israel and greater emphasis on recognizing a Palestinian state. Yet, traditional Republican realism and Democratic liberalism at a decision-making level will continue to condition policy outcomes. Within this context, a second Trump presidency is seen as more transactional and willing to empower Israel, potentially leading to higher risks of conflict with Iran, perhaps even intentionally so. On the other hand, the Democratic party, while strongly supportive of Israel, is viewed as more cautious and influenced by both international and domestic opinion, despite the policy gridlock taking place internally within the party. Professor Alaa Elhadidi believes that while the Republican party, in comparison, is more aligned in its position on the war, this does not mean that a possible Republican administration under the transactional character of Trump will not seek to advance its own vision for peace in the Middle East. Trump, he argues, will try to build on his legacy in the region by crowning it with potential Saudi-Israeli normalization. He notes that this was a goal that has continued to elude Biden throughout his current presidency, despite the repeated announcements from time to time of the imminence of reaching such an arrangement and breakthrough.
Session II: Political & Economic Implications
• With a second Democratic administration, a more critical American stance on human rights issues across the Middle East is expected when compared to Trump’s approach, who is likely to not prioritize this dimension as much. Rather, he would gravitate towards emphasizing economic cooperation — as Trump calls it, “deals” — especially with GCC countries. A second Trump White House will likely prefer to refrain from intervening in the region’s domestic politics in favor of external political and trade relations. Moreover, unlike Trump, a Democratic White House will continue to prioritize global cooperation on climate issues, and thus, bilateral relations with Gulf countries would involve a significant sustainability angle under a second Democratic administration.
• Professor William Gueraiche notes that the United States is no longer perceived as the “policeman of the world” to Middle Eastern allies but rather as a partner, more or less reliable, from which the region hopes to take advantage, and that the Gulf States clearly illustrate the fractal complexity of these foreign policy dynamics. Professor Alaa Elhadidi states that although it is traditionally known that the Democratic party is more inclined to defend human rights issues and democratic processes during the campaign trail, the realities of realpolitik usually put these principles under severe pressure from time to time. This has been evident in the change of tone with Biden when he was still campaigning versus when he assumed office.
• On economic cooperation, while both will most likely work on strengthening trade agreements, a Trump administration would be more isolationist or “America First” in comparison, and prone to using potential tariffs in cases of rising political tensions or disagreements, especially on technological cooperation with China. Moreover, while some Arab states will traditionally continue to work very closely with the US on economic fronts, China’s increasing and strategic engagement in the region, particularly in artificial intelligence and infrastructure (the Belt and Road Initiative), will continue to create a complex landscape for any incoming Administration to navigate. Trump’s confrontational approach contrasts with Biden’s more concessional stance towards China. With Trump, we can expect a more hardline approach, putting regional countries in a corner to choose between either cooperation with the US or China.
• Professor William Gueraiche believes that short-term interests, especially when they are economic, will prevail, and that the consolidation of regional economic blocs or even the strengthening of bilateral ties seems a credible alternative to uncontrollable globalization from the viewpoint of the US. Professor Alaa Elhadidi also notes that the American need for Gulf oil has not diminished, despite all of the efforts done to further promote other sources of renewable energy. This reality will continue to impact any future administration, be it Democratic or Republican.
• Regarding approaches to economic aid, a second Trump administration is expected to be more focused on protectionism, and reducing foreign aid as there is little belief in the latter’s economic value to the United States. In contrast, a Democratic administration is expected to maintain the current US foreign aid levels and commitment to globalization. This will be of direct and almost immediate impact on US support, or lack thereof, for UNRWA.
• Given the current Israel-Gaza war, Trump’s more unilateral and Israel-centric stance might exacerbate tensions and reduce Egypt’s ability to influence outcomes positively; however, he is expected to act more decisively in his attempt to end the current ongoing war. The Biden administration has lost its credibility among both regional and global players, with his announced plan still facing paralysis in its implementation, and the war showing no signs of abating.
Session III: Security & Proxy Implications
• As has been true since 1979, the Iranian threat will continue to influence American decisions in the region under any president. This notwithstanding, the US government finds itself at odds with some of its traditional allies in how to address this threat, especially on basic approach (diplomacy and negotiations vs. confrontation) and timing. On the one hand, Washington remains adamant about protecting Israel against Tehran and its proxies. On the other hand, Arab countries are leaning more towards a rapprochement with Iran, noting both China’s mediation as well as recent diplomatic engagements with Gulf countries.
• This misalignment in approach and timing will be further complicated by the perceptions and priorities of the next president, and his or her cabinet, concerning Iran. A Democratic administration is likely to view Tehran and its problems through the lens of balancing US interests in the region, while still providing military support to Israel. This would probably be very different in a second term for Trump, who is expected to double down on confronting Tehran, following his previous “maximum pressure” campaign, which included the targeted killing of Lieutenant General Qasem Soleimani.
• Professor James Lockhart emphasizes that both Democrats and Republicans regard Tehran as either an enemy or a serious threat to American and allied security. The differences are that some, and they have tended to be Democrats and diplomats, would like to negotiate solutions with Iran while others, and they are typically Republicans and military officers, prefer confrontation and sanctions, and although there are different approaches to dealing with Tehran, all agree that it’s an enemy that poses serious threat.
• Additionally, the complexities surrounding the US intervention in Syria are both impacted and limited by a Russian commitment to the country and its government that dates back to the Cold War. A Trump administration would be inclined to a complete withdrawal of US military forces and support, and this stands somewhat in contrast to the Democratic party’s thinking. However, both administrations would remain disposed to continue what Biden has characterized as “over- the-horizon capabilities,” or the power to strike targets in Syria through missiles, drones, and perhaps covert paramilitary operations as opposed to conventional interventions. In any case, both Trump and a Democratic president would have to weigh the consequences of increased pressure and action against Syria if they intend to prevent exacerbating and possibly escalating broader regional conflicts.
• Regarding the ongoing conflict in Yemen, which has spilled into the Red Sea, US involvement is not expected to witness immediate changes under a second Democratic administration. Current US positions on this front indicate worry that any direct response, in bigger proportions, towards the Houthis will result in more escalations with Iran, in addition to increased threats of attack against Israel, potentially leading to a more international conflict involving Russia and/or China, which neither Trump nor a Democratic White House would welcome.
• The concern of preventing escalation may be beyond the influence of any American president. The conflict between Israel and Iran will be increasingly likely to lead to direct confrontation between them in the near to intermediate future. Moreover, internal political dynamics in Israel could escalate this faster than anticipated.
The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the speakers, and do not represent Fiker Institute. Download the PDF to access the full Policy Roundtable Report.
