Veto Power at the United Nations
What Is Happening
The Charter of the United Nations, enacted on June 26, 1945, describes the organization’s purpose as “[maintaining] international peace and security,” “[achieving] international cooperation,” and functioning as “a center for harmonizing the actions of nations.”1 In the almost eight decades since its founding, the United Nations (UN) has been an indispensable convener of the international community, with no other global organization matching its legitimacy, reach, and normative impact. At the same time, the distribution of power among its member states has, over the years, led to growing concerns regarding the inability of its main organs to take effective and decisive action in the face of growing humanitarian and security crises.
Often cited as the cause of the organization’s inaction is the veto power granted to the Security Council’s (UNSC) five permanent members: the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France. Granting veto power to prominent nations in 1945 was a precursor to establishing a multilateral organization that would effectively regulate peace and security in the aftermath of two world wars. It was seen as a compromise for the formation of an international security regime at the time. However, the direct use of the veto, or the implicit threat of its use, has stopped the adoption of numerous critical and time-sensitive resolutions, especially in recent years. This has led to a number of countries, including Germany, to call for fundamental reform to the organization’s decision-making processes, and to ensure that the United Nations adapts to the geopolitical realities of the 21st century.2
At its founding, the UNSC was tasked with maintaining peace and security, and investigating acts of aggression and other threats to peace. Although it attempts to settle disputes peacefully, it also has the authority to impose sanctions and to authorize the use of force.3 While all member states are represented at the General Assembly (GA), the UNSC is composed of only fifteen members, five of which are permanent. The remaining ten members are selected by the GA for two-year terms at the UNSC.4 In order to issue a resolution at the UNSC, nine affirmative votes out of a total of fifteen are required, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members. This means that if one permanent member does not agree with a proposal, it automatically fails.5 For example, if the establishment of a no-fly zone is proposed in order to curb aerial attacks by an aggressor, any of the five permanent members – the United Kingdom, the United States, China, Russia, and France – can stop the proposal from being enacted without having to cite or put forth a specific reasoning.6
Additionally, the veto power of the permanent members extend to the selection of Secretary-Generals, the admission of new states to the UN, the proposal of amendments to the Charter, and whether a matter on the agenda is procedural or substantive to begin with.7 This distinction is significant: procedural matters, relating to the process of taking or implementing a decision, are not subject to the permanent members’ veto power, while substantive matters, the decisions themselves, can be vetoed.8 So, in theory, a procedural decision can be taken at the UNSC with a total of only nine affirmative votes. However, the question of whether a matter is procedural or substantive is subject to being vetoed.9 This phenomenon is termed the “double veto,”10 and allows permanent members to stop virtually any decision from being issued at the UNSC.
Considering that UNSC decisions are legally binding for all states,11 the veto allows the five permanent members to amend international governance decisions based on their own self-interests, or that of their close allies. Even the implicit indication by a permanent member that they would veto a decision can paralyze the formation of a time-sensitive resolution. In this sense, the political alliances and ideologies of the five permanent members have, throughout the decades, stood in the way of fulfilling the very aims enshrined in the Charter itself; namely, to uphold international peace and security. Historically, this paralysis has been evident in places such as Rwanda, Darfur, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and the Balkans, to name a few.12 Since only the UNSC can authorize the use of force, even widespread calls for action can be futile in the face of the permanent members’ veto power.
Why It Is Happening
The veto debate lies at the heart of how the Security Council was built in the first place. Both the veto power and permanency of the five members have been written into the Charter to ultimately stop another world war from occurring. The League of Nations, established in 1920 after World War I for the same purposes, had failed, and the two world wars had claimed 80 million lives in one century.13 As such, it was evident in the 1940s that if a new multilateral order was to be established successfully, great political powers of the time, the winners of World War II, would need to be on board. The military prowess and economic might of the victors of World War II would be needed to uphold the principles agreed upon in the Charter.14 Moreover, a significant majority of the world’s population either resided in those countries or that of their direct allies at the time. Former U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote in 1943, “Britain, Russia, China, the U.S, and their allies represent more than three-quarters of the total population of the earth. As long as these nations with great military power stick together in determination to keep the peace, there will be no possibility of an aggressor Nation arising to start another world war.”15 Thus, considering the political, economic, military, and demographic dynamics of the time, the majority of potential member states understood that the victors’ participation was crucial for the establishment of the organization, and agreed on the compromise of including both the veto power and the permanency of the five members in the Charter itself.
During negotiations phase of the Charter, the five now-permanent members of the UNSC agreed that they should maintain the right to unilaterally veto any substantive matter decided upon at the UN. In fact, solidarity on this front was so strong that the question of the veto became existential for the organization – without the veto, there would not be a collective security regime.16 The principle point of contention among them was whether the use of the veto can extend to matters in which they themselves were a party.17 The Soviet Union was insistent on the “principle of unanimity,” that is, consensus in all instances.18 In a letter to U.S. President Roosevelt, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin wrote that “the unanimity of agreement of four powers [USSR, U.S., UK, China] [was] necessary for the struggle against aggression in the future,” and thus, removal of the veto for permanent members, even when they are parties to the dispute in question, could “put certain powers in opposition to other great powers.”19
During the United Nations Conference on International Organization, referred to as the San Francisco Conference, which took place between 25 April and 26 June, 1945, a number of small and middle-sized countries opposed bestowing veto power on permanent members of the Security Council, and also to the concept of having permanent members on the Council to begin with.20 Delegates pointed out that these provisions would create an inequitable distribution of power, which would be against the principle of sovereign equality of states, and would represent a form of “victors’ justice.”21 During the conference, Australia, for example, pointed out that if the organization failed to settle disputes due to veto power, the disputes would have to be resolved outside of the organization’s framework, possibly in a manner contrary to the principles of international cooperation.22 Cuba maintained that the UNSC’s failure to act would amount to an encouragement of war.23 Other states argued that if the Charter contains too rigid a designation of permanent members, the ability of the UN to adapt to the changing nature of power in the international system, thus its permanence as a global governance mechanism, would be hampered.24 Nearly eight decades later, those same concerns remain poignant.
In the end, the now-permanent members were explicit that their participation in any multilateral organization hinged on having veto power over substantive matters, including matters to which they were a party.25 As such, other states realized that they would need to capitulate to the veto requirement in order to establish an international security regime.26 Ultimately, the Charter was signed on June 26, 1945, containing provisions that granted veto power on substantive matters to the five permanent members, and without excluding a permanent member from voting on a matter to which it was a party.27
In the span of a few years, the veto power became a major obstacle standing in the way of an effective and functional UN. In fact, by August 1, 1950, the Soviet Union alone had vetoed 45 draft resolutions.28 Until the end of the Cold War, veto power was used a total of 201 times.29 Although veto use had subsided in the late 1990s and early 2000s, records show a recent spike in veto use in the UNSC, with a total of 54 veto uses between the end of the Cold War and early 2020.30 Since the organization’s creation, the United States cast a veto 81 times, followed by the United Kingdom with 29, France with 15, and China with 14.31
What Is Being Done About It?
There have been many attempts in the GA to either bypass or reform the veto power at the UNSC. As early as 1946, a GA resolution “earnestly [requested]” the permanent members “to make every effort… to ensure that the use of the [veto] does not impede the Security Council in reaching its decision.”32 Similarly in 1949, the GA recommended that the veto be used “only when [the permanent members] consider the question of vital importance.”33 To address the issue, in 1950, the GA passed the “Uniting for Peace” resolution with fifty votes in favor and five abstentions in order to work around the UNSC veto.34 According to “Uniting for Peace,” in cases where there is a Security Council deadlock, matters relating to the tenancy of international peace and security can be taken up by the GA, at least as recommendations. In 1962, the International Court of Justice recognized the resolution, stating that the UNSC has the “primary” but not the “exclusive” authority over such matters, and the GA can make recommendations for enforcement action (although it cannot authorize such action unilaterally).35
In more recent history, similar initiatives have been proposed by member states, pragmatically focusing on changes to voting and veto practices that do not necessarily require Charter amendments, which can be vetoed by permanent members. Notably, in 2015, France, with the support of Mexico, launched the “Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocity,” which was aimed at securing voluntary restraint by the permanent members when faced with atrocities.36 As of April 2022, the declaration has been signed by 103 members.37 Also in 2015, the Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency Group (ACT) proposed a “Code of Conduct Regarding Security Council Action Against Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, or War Crimes.”38 The proposal calls all members of the UNSC, and especially the permanent members, to not vote against any credible draft resolutions intended to prevent or halt mass atrocities.39 The issue with these initiatives, however, is that since they are not in the Charter itself, their implementation is voluntary. While they cannot be vetoed by permanent members, there is also no enforcement mechanism to ensure states abide by their provisions.
There have also been recent initiatives taken at the GA itself with the aim of curbing veto use and preventing multilateral inaction. Notably, last month, the GA adopted a new resolution by consensus, whereby, for the first time, it will be required “to hold a debate on the situation” that sparks a veto in the UNSC within ten working days, with precedence given on the list of speakers to the permanent member who casts a veto.40 Although the GA is not required to take or consider any action under the resolution, the goal is that the discussion could put veto-wielders on the spot, acting as a disincentive to casting a veto.41 In addition, the resolution allows all 193 states to be heard on matters that are primarily discussed at the UNSC,42 thus addressing long-standing criticism by member states that the exclusivity of UNSC procedures goes against the principle of sovereign equality under the Charter.
The resolution had been in the works for two years, spearheaded by Liechtenstein’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Christian Wenaweser. While presenting the resolution, he said, “There has never been a stronger need for effective multilateralism than today, and there has never been a stronger need for innovation in order to secure the central role and voice of the United Nations.”43 The widespread support for reform at the UN is evident by the fact that the resolution had 80 co-sponsors, including the United States and the United Kingdom.44 On the adopted resolution, Brazil’s Permanent Representative Costa Filho said, “A representative council which reflects the current international system is central to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the future of this organization.”45
More ambitious proposals have also been previously put forth. In 2005, Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (also referred to as the “G4”) drafted a resolution to reform the UNSC to fit contemporary international dynamics.46 The resolution called for four additional non-permanent and six additional permanent seats, bringing the number of Council members from 15 to 25.47 Their reasoning was that, while the number of GA members have increased from 51 to 193 in the 77 years since the UN’s founding, the UNSC has remained identical since 1963, when the number of seats was increased from 6 to 10.48 Further, the G4 proposal was meant to address the idiosyncrasy that neither India and Brazil, the most populous countries in Asia and the Americas, respectively, nor Japan and Germany, the largest donors of the UN, have seats at the Security Council.49 At the time, this proposal was met with contending ones that addressed diverging concerns, one from the African Union, and one from the “Uniting for Consensus Group,” led by Italy, Argentina, Pakistan, and Mexico.50 With three competing draft resolutions on the matter of UNSC reform, none of them were put to vote at the GA.51 Since then, the G4 countries have regularly met to renew their demands for structural reform, as well as addressing the GA on this matter.52 They also continue to support each others’ candidature for permanent seats at the Council.53 Their formal proposals, however, have still not been voted on at the GA.
What’s Next?
Although there has been a multitude of initiatives for structural reform at the UNSC, none have yet taken hold. Amendments to the Charter are the only viable avenue to reform the veto structure and to change the composition of the UNSC, but the permanent members have no incentive to give up their advantageous positions. As the Charter amendments remain subject to the permanent members’ veto power, any change at the UNSC will have to be consented on by both the five countries and their closest allies.
In the near future, it is up to prominent nation-states and regional alliances, especially those whose interests have been undermined by the existence of the veto, to take more concrete collective steps and propose bolder initiatives to address the aforementioned challenges. To ensure the tenancy of international peace and security, it is crucial that the UNSC’s authority is not undermined, but that the UN remains an effective actor and a credible convener of the international community.
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