
Undoing the Transatlantic Partnership: Europe vs. Trump
The transatlantic partnership, historically a shared pillar of security and economic prosperity for the United States (US) and Europe, now faces unprecedented challenges as US President Donald Trump’s second term ushers in a new era of confrontation. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2025, Vice President JD Vance sharply criticized European leadership, revealing the widening rift between the traditional allies. His remarks accusing Europe of straying from its democratic values and diverging from US policies was not received well by attending officials. The episode captured the growing disengagement of the current US administration from Europe.
In the post-World War II era, Europe has relied on the US as its primary security guarantor. This strategic dependence served US interests, with Europe representing a bulwark against the Soviet Union and ensuring the US would be the dominant security force in the post-Cold War era. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brought Europe to center-stage of US geopolitics. As Europe’s relationship with Russia deteriorated rapidly amid disruptions to European energy imports from Russia and Russia’s security threats to European states, the continent became increasingly dependent on American support for its energy needs and security. However, the re-election of Trump with his transactional and America-first approach casts a doubt on this reliance. The second Trump administration’s rhetoric vis-à-vis its transatlantic allies and its policies on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia’s war in Ukraine, and trade represent a fundamental break with the US’ traditional position, compelling Europe to urgently reassess and adapt its geopolitical and economic strategies amid mounting uncertainties.
NATO & EUROPEAN SECURITY
NATO has provided strategic leverage for the US against Russian influence, while offering Europe a security umbrella without full financial or military burdens. However, the Trump administration intends to fundamentally alter this arrangement, shifting the burden of European defense onto Europe itself. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth explicitly communicated this at his first NATO meeting in February, calling for Europe to take greater responsibility for its security and defense.
Trump views NATO as an economic burden rather than a strategic asset, believing Europe benefits disproportionately from American financial and military contributions. During his first term, he pressured allies to increase their defense spending to 2% of GDP, even threatening to withdraw the US from NATO altogether. He also ordered the withdrawal of nearly 12,000 troops from Germany, which was suspended under the Biden administration but nevertheless signaled Trump’s broader strategic detachment from Europe. Now, in his second term, Trump has escalated his demands, calling for NATO members to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP—a demand that far exceeds what the US contributes and is largely unattainable for most alliance members. While countries like Poland already spend proportionally more than the US on defense and see higher targets as a vital deterrent against Russia, other countries such as Italy and Germany find the demand unrealistic, with some officials labeling it as “madness.”
Further complicating transatlantic security relations, Trump’s renewed ambition to annex Greenland, a territory of Denmark, has heightened diplomatic tensions. Greenland is crucial due to its strategic position in the Arctic region, its potential resource wealth—including rare-earth elements—and its implications for navigation and defense. Trump’s plans were firmly rebuffed by Denmark, with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen unequivocally declaring Greenland “not for sale.” Additionally, Trump’s persistent advocacy for the acquisition has dominated politics in Greenland, including recent elections won by the center-right Demokraatit party, which strongly opposes US annexation. This has heightened European anxieties regarding US territorial ambitions and emphasized the urgent need for Europe to clearly articulate and strengthen its independent security posture in the face of evolving geopolitical realities.
For Europe, forging a robust security framework that does not rely excessively on the US will not be an easy feat. Fragmented defense industries, diverging national interests, reliance on US military and intelligence assets, and limited readiness and logistical capabilities are all serious obstacles the continent must face. Yet, European leaders are deeply aware that failure to adapt could leave Europe vulnerable in an increasingly multipolar world. Consequently, there is a growing momentum toward achieving greater strategic autonomy, as leaders adjust to the reality of US disengagement. Questions of establishing a European Security Council, previously proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel to address European security post-Brexit, have resurfaced. Macron, who has long advocated for greater European autonomy and independent military capabilities, has discussed extending France’s nuclear umbrella to other European countries.
In its latest attempts to achieve strategic independence, the European Union (EU) launched the ReArm Europe initiative to enable member states to increase national defense spending. In early March, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the proposal aiming to mobilize up to €800 billion in defense spending, including a core measure of €150 billion in loans for member states to procure critical equipment such as drones, missiles, artillery, and anti-drone technology. Moreover, inspired partly by Germany’s use of special defense funding (Sondervermögen) to bypass its debt limits, EU leaders are considering allowing countries greater flexibility to increase defense budgets without triggering fiscal penalties for exceeding the EU’s limits on member states’ debt and deficit. However, concerns have emerged over the Commission’s decision to create the €150 billion loans instrument by using Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which allows the Commission to bypass the European Parliament in emergencies, thus limiting parliamentary oversight in the allocation of defense funds. While critics argue this under mines democratic legitimacy and transparency, supporters stress the need for swift action to bolster European security. While Trump had made threats to step back from the US’ traditional role as Europe’s security guarantor during his first term, this time around, European leaders appear more ready to seriously consider alternative security policies for the continent.
RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, support for Kyiv had united transatlantic allies under President Biden. Despite criticism of delays and occasional hesitations in providing certain military equipment, the Biden administration maintained a robust pro-Ukrainian policy. However, Trump’s return to the Presidency has dramatically shifted the US’ stance. The Trump administration has signaled a fundamental realignment on the Ukraine file, breaking ranks with its European allies, and bringing Russian President Vladimir Putin out of Western diplomatic isolation.
Trump’s hostility towards Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his apparent rapprochement with Russia has played out in a series of diplomatic upsets over the first three months of his term. In February, Trump’s administration proposed a minerals deal, seeking significant control over Ukraine’s mineral and energy resources as compensation for US military aid. Zelenskyy declined the US’ initial demand for $500 billion in Ukrainian mineral wealth and insisted any deal include firm US commitments to Ukrainian security. Moreover, tensions between Trump and Zelenskyy rose following the most extensive US-Russia diplomatic engagement since 2022. The ceasefire negotiations between US and Russian officials held in Saudi Arabia deliberately excluded Ukrainian and European representatives, sparking a series of public exchanges between Trump and Zelenskyy. Zelenskyy protested the direct talks, stating that it “helped Putin out of his long isolation” and accused Trump of living in a Russian “disinformation space.” In response, Trump falsely blamed Ukraine for the war, stating that it “should’ve never started it,” despite Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In a social media post the following day, Trump falsely called Zelenskyy a “dictator.” Zelenskyy, whose presidential term was meant to end in 2024, has stayed in office while the country remains under martial law which prohibits holding any elections in wartime due to inability to have fair and credible polls.
These disputes culminated in unprecedented hostility during Zelenskyy’s White House visit on February 28, where the leaders had been expected to sign a revised minerals deal. The framework agreement reportedly would have required Ukraine to allocate half of its natural resource revenues into an “investment fund” for reconstruction managed by the US and Ukraine, though without offering clear US commitments on security guarantees. Instead, Trump and Vice President Vance confronted Zelenskyy in a televised castigation, accusing him of hindering peace negotiations, lacking replace, and “gambling with world war three.” The meeting ended abruptly without resolution, prompting Trump to temporarily suspend US military assistance and intelligence sharing with Ukraine. After the incident, European leaders quickly mobilized in a show of support for Ukraine and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer held a meeting in London to discuss a “coalition of the willing” alongside Britain and France to send peacekeepers to Ukraine. However, US special envoy Steve Witkoff on March 22 dismissed the plan as “posture and pose.”
In the meantime, despite the major fallout from Zelenskyy’s White House meeting, ceasefire talks seem to be moving forward. On March 11, US and Ukrainian officials met in Jeddah and agreed on a thirty-day truce. However, Putin stated that any ceasefire will require “long-term peace.” In a phone call with Trump, he agreed to a temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire, which Zelenskyy also approved the following day during a separate call with the US President. Over the past few days, the US has resumed separate talks with Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Saudi Arabia aiming to make progress on wider de-escalation. Beyond the implications for Ukraine’s security, European NATO countries, particularly those on Russia’s border, view Putin as an existential threat. With NATO’s deterrence predicated entirely on the credibility of its commitment to collective self-defense, Trump’s ambiguity on continued support against Russia risks undermining the transatlantic alliance’s reliability.
TRADE WAR
The renewed trade tensions initiated by Trump highlight a deeper ideological departure from traditional US-EU economic relations. Historically, the US-EU trade relationship—though occasionally marred by disputes—has been central to the economies on both sides of the Atlantic. During Trump’s first term, a trade dispute erupted when the US levied 25% tariffs on steel and 10% on aluminum, prompting EU retaliatory measures. While the dispute eased under Biden’s administration with the temporary suspension of the tariffs, Trump’s return to office has brought a renewed wave of protectionist policies. In early February, he imposed 25% tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports, arguing they are essential to safeguarding American industries. He has also introduced a reciprocal tariff policy, designed to match or exceed the levies imposed on US exports, escalating economic pressure on the EU. Further stoking tensions, Trump called the bloc’s policies “brutal” and “nasty” and accused it of imposing unfair trade policies that harm American businesses.
The EU responded with retaliatory tariffs but has pulled its punches, focusing on maintaining unity among its member states while keeping the option for negotiations open. Brussels has, so far, deliberately avoided using its “anti-coercion instrument,” a legal mechanism established in 2023 designed to deter economic pressure from foreign governments by allowing the EU to impose countermeasures like trade and investment restrictions against coercive trade practices. Instead, the EU’s counter measures, worth €26 billion, aim to match the economic impact of US tariffs, affecting a range of sectors. While European leaders hope to solve the trade disputes through negotiations, an escalating trade war could force them to reconsider the structure and security of their supply chains, potentially leading to partial decoupling from transatlantic trade dependencies.
SUPPORT FOR THE FAR-RIGHT
The Trump administration’s support for far-right movements in Europe is fueling tensions while deepening ideological and diplomatic fractures between the US and its European allies. The growing affinity between the far-right and Trump was particularly evident during the Patriots for Europe summit in Madrid in early February, where leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, France’s Marine Le Pen, the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders, Italy’s Matteo Salvini, and others embraced the slogan “Make Europe Great Again”, mirroring Trump’s MAGA movement.
Trump officials have also elevated far-right parties across Europe. Vice President Vance’s open endorsement of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party in the run-up to the country’s election in February intensified concerns among pro-EU politicians who see Washington’s embrace of populist elements as a direct assault on European democracy. Meanwhile, Elon Musk has broadened the AfD’s platform by frequently amplifying its rhetoric online. For the AfD, which has often been marginalized by mainstream German parties, American endorsement and social media amplification provide both legitimacy and an expanded platform. While Musk’s interference appears to have had a marginal impact on the AfD’s success and on the contrary may have galvanized support for the far-left Die Linke party, his endorsement reportedly increased interest and donations to the AfD and normalized supporting far-right parties. Musk has similarly expressed support for far-right parties in the United Kingdom, Italy and Romania.
However, while Europe’s far-right leaders share broad ideological goals—such as nationalism, anti-Islamic rhetoric, and resistance to EU climate policies—their unity remains fragile. Trump’s tariffs are likely to negatively impact their base while his clashes with Zelenskyy have revealed divisions within the European far-right on Trump’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine file. With Trump’s return amplifying its ambitions, the European far-right is positioning itself as a formidable force but remains constrained by internal contradictions and the complexities of European politics.
NAVIGATING A SHIFTING GLOBAL ORDER
What seems certain is that Europe has decided to take matters into its own hands, signaling a decisive shift toward defense self-sufficiency amid growing uncertainty about US commitments. The EU’s newly issued defense proposal outlines an ambitious strategy to strengthen Europe’s military industry and establish a “strong and sufficient” defense posture by 2030, reducing reliance on external powers. Meanwhile, Germany has taken a historic step in this direction, with the Bundestag passing sweeping reforms that override its debt brake to significantly boost defense funding and military aid to Ukraine. Together, these developments indicate a broader movement toward a more effective European defense community, reinforcing the region’s ability to potentially act independently in global security matters.
However, this newfound European assertiveness raises deeper questions about the future of transatlantic relations and global stability. As the US reduces its commitment to Europe, there is a risk of destabilizing international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, which rely significantly on unified Western support. Without cohesive transatlantic leadership, these institutions could face diminished effectiveness in addressing global challenges like climate change, trade disputes, and international security crises, potentially leading to increased global instability. At the same time, Europe’s strategic recalibration could leave the continent more exposed to Russian and Chinese influence, raising concerns about security vulnerabilities and economic dependencies.
Yet, while the shifting balance of power introduces risks, it also presents an opportunity for Europe to emerge as a more autonomous global actor. By reducing its reliance on American military power, Europe may gain greater flexibility in international decision-making, lessening the political pressure to align with US policies. This independence could foster greater diversity in global governance and allow middle powers to play more influential roles in international affairs, possibly contributing to a more multipolar and balanced global order.
The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author, and do not represent Fiker Institute.
