UN Peacekeeping: Current & Future Missions
Introduction
Peacekeeping, an unquestionably critical contribution by the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security, was not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter in 1945, and thus was never clearly defined.1 Throughout their lengthy history, UN peacekeeping missions have been extensively researched and debated, leading to ongoing questions about their effectiveness, success, and sustainability. While some scholars and practitioners believe that UN peacekeeping has successfully promoted stability and reduced violence under certain conditions, others criticize its seemingly significant shortcomings.
The shooting and killing of an Irish peacekeeper in Lebanon last year reignited the debate on how well the United Nations maintains ceasefires and aids political stability in nations prone to violence and war.2 UN peacekeepers, also known as the “blue helmets”, are often called into nations where protracted chaos has left host governments with no feasible options, especially in the developing world. While they are often viewed as “saviors,” UN peacekeepers have frequently had to stand helplessly watching conflicts unfold, unable to address the underlying root causes of the problems they were summoned to address and resolve.
To this day, the United Nations has approved a total of 71 peacekeeping operations, 12 of which remain operational.3 These missions stretch out across three continents, with seven missions in Africa, two in Europe, and four in Asia – three of which are located in the Middle East.4 The United Nations at present has around 90,000 peacekeepers among its ranks,5 20,000 of whom are active in one mission alone, namely the UNMISS in South Sudan. It is currently the largest peacekeeping mission in the world.6 The most recent mission was first deployed in Haiti in 2017 and concluded its work in just two years,7 while the oldest and longest mission was established in 1948 in the Middle East, known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).8
Using cases from three active peacekeeping operations, specifically UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), UNISFA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei), and MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara), this issue brief will examine and evaluate why UN peacekeeping operations have struggled to carry out their goals and objectives, and provide policy recommendations for current and future missions.
Background
The definition of peacekeeping has been debated widely over the years, and the concept of “generations” has been used to describe its evolution. As such, UN peacekeeping operations are divided into three developmental phases also known as the three generations. Across all phases, multilateral forces were deployed in various conflict zones.9 In these specific areas, combat had to first be halted, and impartial third parties were then called in to implement or monitor peace agreements. Additionally, all peacekeeping operations are bound by three principles, which are impartiality, the non-use of force except in self-defense and protection of the mandate, and the consent of the parties.10 However, the latter has been breached many times. Since the end of the Second World War and throughout the Cold War era, thirteen peacekeeping operations were deployed, mostly in interstate conflicts.11 Their foremost objective was to observe borders and establish neutral areas after the settlement of ceasefires. The missions included national troops from impartial and small UN member states, usually armed with light weapons. Those missions were referred to as first-generation peacekeeping,12 and UNIFIL stands as a key example. Deployed in the South of Lebanon in 1978, UNIFIL was set to diffuse political unrest that was ignited by the 1975 civil war that broke out between different religious groups. Against the backdrop of the civil war, Israel invaded Lebanon on March 1978.13 The Lebanese government filed an official complaint to the UN Security Council in response to the invasion, and UNIFIL was immediately deployed to the country.14 The main mandate of this mission was to monitor the cessation of hostilities between the two countries, and observe bordering areas to avoid further escalations.
With the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping missions transformed significantly due to the challenges that the international community had to respond to, which were beyond the scope of first-generation missions. Consequently, not only did the missions increase in numbers, but their operations also underwent major alterations in nature, compositions, and roles.15 This second-generation of peacekeeping, which lasted until the end of the 1990s, became more complex and diverse. Peacekeepers were not exclusively military personnel, they were also civilian experts and diplomats, selected from a wider pool of countries and cultures. Approximately, more than half of the United Nations Member States participated in second-generation missions.16 Small and impartial nations were no longer the only leading contributors to missions, and they were joined by nations from Asia like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India, in addition to African countries including Ghana, Nigeria, and Ethiopia.17 In 1991, MINURSO was deployed as a result of the conflict over Western Sahara, which started in 1975 between Morocco and the Polisario Front, a national liberation movement to end Spanish colonialism in the region at the time.18 As a result, clashes erupted between the two parties which led to the deployment of UN forces. These troops aimed to resolve the conflict in accordance with a settlement plan that called for a ceasefire and the organization of a referendum to decide between integration with Morocco or independence.19
Following this period, third-generation peacekeeping was introduced when forces had to deal with militias and warlords whose atrocities extended beyond the scope of the second-generation missions. While a large group of international law scholars does not officially recognize third-generation peacekeeping, some argue that the expanded robustness of these new missions, their larger military capacities, their focus on human security, and their ability to deter violence places them in a new category of their own.20 In Sudan, for example, UNISFA was deployed in 2011 to monitor Abyei, a border region between South Sudan and Sudan.21 Although the civil war between the north and south formally ended in 2005, the two parties were not aligned over the status of three areas, namely the Blue Nile, Kordofan, and Abyei. Precisely, the conflict over the latter symbolized the increasingly strained relations between South Sudan and Sudan.22 Both countries consider Abyei a region of great political and symbolic importance. To diffuse tensions, UNISFA’s objective was to effectively implement a ceasefire, demilitarize the region, monitor the border between Sudan and South Sudan, and facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid.23
Discussion
As a short-term alternative to addressing the root causes of conflicts, UN peacekeeping has become a somewhat convenient solution for decreasing tensions in conflict areas, but has resulted in cyclical challenges that are difficult to resolve. Donor countries pledge millions of dollars in aid to the UN every year, and the organization in turn provides assistance whenever a war, crisis, or conflict erupts. Eventually, a ceasefire is usually announced, with agreements often signed.24 However, a few days later, violence breaks out again. Often, this cycle has continued for years on end. This has been the case for missions in all three generations, despite the expansion of resources, mandates, and personnel. Common factors in all the cases examined thus far include the unstable security environments that UN peacekeepers find themselves in, which impose limits on how far they can interfere in various aspects of conflict resolution. Additionally, peacekeeping missions are not currently supported by clear and affirmative political processes, and are often understaffed and underfunded.25 Furthermore, missions often face resistance from different parties in a conflict, including local populations.
As is evident, ensuring the safety and security of personnel is even more challenging in regions where the security architecture is both unpredictable and volatile. For instance, UNIFIL was deployed because of a foreign invasion preceded by a civil war. Its mandate was altered due to a number of major events, mainly the crisis of July and August of 2006.26 Despite its presence and expansion on the borders, UNIFIL was unable to prevent the 34-day conflict that erupted in July 2006,27 in addition to ongoing border clashes, the latest of which took place in April 2023.28 In such a threatening environment, where both countries are still “technically at war” without any diplomatic relations,29 peacekeepers have limited options to help ease tensions in accordance with their legal mandates. Similarly in Western Sahara, although the security environment was relatively stable and the ceasefire lasted nearly 30 years between the parties, Sahrawis have been exerting pressure on Polisario leaders for years to take further action, even if it means employing force.30 As such, in 2020, the ceasefire came to an end.31 From then onwards, clashes resumed between the parties, the latest incident taking place this year.32 In Sudan, the presence of peacekeepers in Abyei did not prevent clashes in several bordering regions, which led to the extension of the mission’s mandate to cover the international border between the two countries.33 UNISFA also could not stop the inter-communal dispute in the demilitarized zone that took place in January 2023.34 UNISFA was also threatened by landmines in its areas of operation, with both Sudan and South Sudan refusing to provide their maps of existing mines.35
While peacekeeping missions have been an easy target of international criticism, their limitations have more often than not been out of their direct control. Working with a wide range of actors, including the parties to the conflict, local populations, and other national and international organizations, UN peacekeepers have to navigate complex political and cultural landscapes. When carrying out their mandates, the missions must also uphold and respect the host state’s sovereignty. In return, to be able to have a considerable impact, peacekeepers require a supporting political climate from their host countries. No real political process supported UNIFIL in Lebanon, for example.36 It was difficult for the mission to accomplish anything other than its stated military goals. Even the strongest peacekeeping mission cannot substitute a political process but can help establish it with the “support of the Government […] and its efforts to exercise its authority effectively throughout its territory”.37 In Western Sahara, political negotiations were ongoing, but the peacekeeping mission was not actively involved.38 This “de-linking of the ceasefire from the political work” that was delegated to a personal envoy has also negatively affected the peacekeeping mandate.39 In Abyei, political development has not been sustained. The work of the Joint Oversight Committee, which is tasked to monitor the administration area, has never been continuous, and failed to meet several times since 2017.40
Insufficient resources are also a major challenge for peacekeepers, whether in the form of equipment, manpower, or funds. These institutional limitations hinder their ability to successfully carry out their mandates. Lacking its own troops, the United Nations relies on the “goodwill” of its Member States to provide soldiers.41 As such, the organization struggles to gather the necessary forces because countries are often unwilling to sacrifice the lives of their soldiers in conflicts that they have no direct interest in. The missions in return end up with inadequately equipped and underpaid soldiers.42 During the initial deployment of troops to Abyei, the “only Ethiopian” mission suffered from several setbacks ranging from the shortage of air transport resources and logistics to weak communications, food delivery issues, and poor accommodation.43
The presence of foreign troops, regardless of their UN affiliation, can also breed hostility among local communities. Some have complained about the arrogance of peacekeepers, and the extravagant accommodations they enjoy in comparison to the strikingly different realities that local populations face in times of crisis and violence.44 Whether or not these views are constructive, they have usually prevented locals from cooperating with UN operations, even when they meet their goals.45 Peacekeepers are often deployed despite the disproval of conflicting parties, and their unwillingness to cooperate with the mission and with each other. In Lebanon, the main issue facing UNIFIL is the lack of consent from the parties to the conflict before and during the deployment.46 They never really valued the UNIFIL mandate, which was severely instrumentalized for security and political gains, and its convoys were attacked, ambushed, and kidnapped numerous times.47 UNIFIL, however, also suffered from internal disagreement in the UN Security Council over its creation.48 Similarly, the Government of Sudan refused to consider UNISFA a UN mission because it solely included Ethiopian soldiers.49 UN peacekeepers in Sudan also faced a lack of cooperation between the parties that initially disagreed over the appointment of the Head of the Abyei administration and the Speaker of the Abyei Legislative Council, which has exacerbated the issue.50
Recommendations
Despite these challenges and setbacks, the international community should rethink peacekeeping operations as opposed to abandoning their current approach entirely. Even with their seemingly minimal contributions, peacekeepers are frequently the only immediate resort to protect local populations. That said, there are a number of policy recommendations that should be taken into consideration for current and future peacekeeping missions, including:
1. Deploying troops only after a thorough evaluation of the situation
The first principle of UN peacekeeping, which is the consent of the parties prior to the deployment, should be more seriously enforced. Peacekeeping operations should be created and established only after the approval and consultation of all relevant parties, including the conflicting parties, their local populations, and relevant regional and international actors. This process should include a clear and accurate evaluation of the situation in the host country, as missions should not be deployed in a rush, despite how pressing the circumstances may be. Initially considered as “interim” missions, UNIFIL, UNISFA, and MINURSO all seem to be extending their presence indefinitely due to the lack of a thoroughly targeted approach that could have minimized the current gridlocks standing in their way. Examples from these three peacekeeping operations show that numerous challenges stemmed from quick deployment decisions, coupled with the miscalculations of deadlines.
UNIFIL’s central area of operations, which needed to be decided upon quickly at the time, was left unresolved as the first report establishing the force was produced without any information from the field, and out of a political desire to force a rapid decision.51 This created severe difficulties for UNIFIL’s work on the ground. UNISFA troops were also deployed “more quickly than is usually the case.”52 MINURSO was created without knowledge of what the parties to the conflict even wanted. Although fast deployment is crucial to saving lives, it puts peacekeepers’ lives at risk. When the deployment is rushed, peacekeeping forces often lack what they need to succeed and keep them safe, especially in securing areas of operations and understanding local dynamics.
2. Prioritizing solutions for the root causes of the conflict
The absence of violence does not mean long-term stability. Underlying tensions and the possibility of future outbreaks should not be discounted. The peacekeeping missions covered in this analysis succeeded in sustaining peace for a specific length of time, but they were never able to establish long-lasting stability. Only after resolving the conflict’s underlying causes can a peacekeeping mission help the conflicting parties in putting their mutual agreements into practice, and in an actual sustainable manner. The challenges that UNISFA encountered in Sudan were the direct result of the unresolved issues that go back to South Sudan’s independence. The agreement that established the mission itself did not offer a solution to the central problem, which is Abyei’s status.53 The reason MINURSO was unable to resolve the Western Sahara conflict was due to its emphasis on dispute settlement, which is more concerned with fostering stability by reducing violence than with addressing the underlying causes of conflict.54 The awareness of events on the ground has also been impacted by the lack of a system to monitor ongoing developments.55 Likewise, numerous discussions regarding altering UNIFIL’s mission and structure have taken place, but none appear to be focused on finding real long-term solutions that address the root causes through objective frameworks of analysis that actually include on-the-ground voices and historical, cultural, and even religious lenses of examination.
3. Balancing the diversification of the mission’s composition
Peacekeeping missions should naturally include personnel from different backgrounds and equip them with the necessary resources to carry out their mandates properly. Decision-makers should also prioritize the inclusion of individuals with contextual expertise in their assigned regions. A high degree of diversity results in a mix of perspectives, capacities, and approaches that significantly improve the protection of civilian lives and decrease fatalities.56 Along with local and international civilians, this also calls for more leadership and participation of women. In fact, the UN has already established a 2028 target for the number of uniformed women in peacekeeping operations.57 “The presence of female peacekeepers […] positively impacts the confidence of the local population,” said Seema Dhundia, the leader of the first-ever all-female UN peacekeeping that was deployed in Liberia in 2007.58 This is not to rule out the role of men in peacekeeping but to emphasize the ability of women to have better access to vulnerable communities, especially to local women who are not allowed to interact with men in some parts of the world. The presence of women breaks down cultural and social barriers, and enables the creation of safe spaces for women to report violations.
Ensuring diversity in missions will not be an easy and quick endeavor. Managing troops from a single background is significantly much easier than coordinating operations with many involved nations. For instance, UNISFA in Sudan was distinct from previous missions since its personnel were all from Ethiopia. Due to more familiarity with the region’s history and context, Ethiopian forces were expected to more thoroughly understand and better grasp the local conditions in Sudan.59 Consequently, a mission’s composition should be decided on a case-by-case basis depending on the situation.
4. Strengthening the communications and digital presence of missions
As disinformation against UN peacekeepers has increased over the past few years, and considering that disinformation rapidly spreads online,60 it is recommended that peacekeeping missions strengthen their presence across different social media platforms. They could do so in two different ways. First, monitoring social media for hate speech and disinformation and working on countering them, and second using social media as a platform to foster dialogue. In this regard, peacekeepers should engage and collaborate with all stakeholders, including regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, and civil society groups to help bridge gaps and build the capacities of local actors to guarantee sustainability after the mission ends.
Peacekeepers should also adopt more digital technologies that would aid in intelligence gathering, performance assessment, and information security in addition to addressing challenges like the weaponization of technology and cyberattacks. This was endorsed by the UN Secretary-General in the 2018 Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping, which sought to enhance peacekeepers’ safety and security while enabling a more efficient implementation of mandates.61 Indeed, with the emergence of new technologies such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), peacekeepers should understand how these digital technologies are reshaping conflict dynamics, which would help them establish early warning systems and detect threats.
Conclusion
Peacekeeping, the international community’s collective conflict resolution method, may seem ineffective at first glance, like a bandage covering an enormous wound. Not taking into account the nuances of challenges that peacekeeping missions face, states have high expectations for their role in quickly resolving complex and protracted conflicts. This can be challenging, and the results are not always immediate or obvious. Missions are understaffed, underfunded, and politically constrained, while their efforts are challenged by local dynamics. They frequently tend to transition from “interim” forces to “permanent” forces, and sometimes risk becoming involved players in the conflict.
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPO) and the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT) recently signed a Strategic Partnership Framework Action Plan.62 This action plan’s objective is to integrate counterterrorism initiatives in UN peacekeeping operations and elsewhere where needed. Adding counterterrorism responsibilities to peacekeeping would make an already challenging job much more difficult. Peacekeepers are meant to be impartial, and by being involved in counterterrorism they risk becoming party to conflicts, and face different sets of challenges. Instead of mixing counterterrorism with peace efforts, more support should be given to peacekeepers to help them function in such circumstances, while empowering them to actually implement their existing mandates and responsibilities.
To access the works cited & endnotes, download the full report.
The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author, and do not represent Fiker Institute.
