Trump & the Gulf: Considerations for the New Administration
Despite the tumult and drama surrounding Trump’s first administration, the incoming 47th President-elect of the United States was pivotal in advancing US-Gulf dialogue during his term. The promotion of wider Khaleeji political, economic, and defense interests in Washington was more palpable under his watch, a shift welcomed by Gulf capitals as they emerged out of the Obama years. It was a combination of Trump’s pragmatism, his position on Iran, and his refrain from interfering in domestic affairs that garnered him substantial goodwill in this part of the region. Trump’s first administration built a favorable working relationship with all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members in an attempt to course-correct the trajectory of US-Gulf ties at the time. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, notably, maintained productive relations with the Trump White House throughout his four years in office, despite Trump’s lukewarm response to the attacks on Saudi oil installations in 2019.
This reservoir of goodwill remains intact. However, Trump now confronts a transformed Middle East, with the ongoing wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and a Khaleeji urgency to de-risk the region. By promoting regional stability, the GCC states aim to enable both their immediate and long-term priorities, specifically the realization of their national economic visions and a stable political and societal transition towards a post-oil era. In this context, Trump faces the challenge of navigating the complexities of internal Israeli politics as well, particularly concerning the political fate of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Given Netanyahu’s imperative to evade conviction, he is compelled to sustain his existing ruling coalition, but this may extend the war on Gaza for a prolonged period even after Trump’s inauguration, complicating the President-elect’s stated objective to swiftly put an end to the war.
In any case, it is important to recognize that the Gulf’s pursuit of de-escalation and its transition from hard geopolitics to soft geoeconomics commenced during Trump’s first term, and we can anticipate these trends to accelerate. This growing Khaleeji confidence stems from a decade-long emphasis on national power-building and deftly utilizing instruments of the state. The optimal approach to advance collective Khaleeji interests is to candidly convey to the incoming US State Department team that the Gulf’s governments are willing to endorse Trump’s promise to de-escalate tensions in the region, while concurrently pursuing their individual national transformation agendas. The Gulf capitals can act as able partners and mediators for Trump in his endeavour to restore a productive American role in the region, but this may prove difficult in light of his potential cabinet picks, if and when they get confirmed. It is premature to determine which of the rival isolationist or neoconservative factions will prevail in influencing Trump. Gulf states, however, will attempt to navigate both scenarios even if they coexist under tension, although the isolationist perspective aligns more closely with Trump’s image and domestic rhetoric.
ON IRAN: NAVIGATING A ‘2.0 MAXIMUM PRESSURE POLICY’
Following Trump’s re-election, numerous experts have speculated how his new government will navigate its historically contentious relations with Iran. Trump’s team has addressed these speculations by declaring their intention to reinstate the “maximum pressure” policy, which seeks to incapacitate Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons and finance regional proxies. Trump’s revitalized maximum strategy may entail strengthening sanctions on Iran, particularly targeting oil exports. A national security specialist familiar with Trump’s transition to the Oval Office noted that “(Trump) is determined to reinstitute a maximum pressure strategy to bankrupt Iran as soon as possible.” Ray Takeyh, a prominent specialist on Iran, highlighted the significant effectiveness of the sanctions, arguing that it could forge the path for some form of stabilization in the region. The anti-Iran hawks within the US foreign policy establishment may view this favorably for both American and regional interests, but the Israel-Iran rivalry, the war in Gaza and Lebanon, and broader repercussions, will test GCC-US relations and challenge the stability that the Americans seek to re-construct.
While Trump has pledged to end ongoing wars in the region, he must consider the consequences of escalating disorder and the economic fallout if there is only a pause to the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon rather than a lasting peace that can address the broader rift between Iran and Israel. While a hardline approach may be tempting, Washington would benefit from examining the Gulf’s recent initiatives to de-escalate tensions with Iran as a primary point of departure. Relations between the Gulf and Iran have markedly transformed since Trump’s first term, offering a new dynamic that the US might utilize to promote regional stability and the geo-economic agenda prioritized by the President-elect. Although Iran’s enablement of extremism and instability must cease, any excessive application of force is unlikely to accomplish this objective in the long term. A maximum pressure policy may provide short-term satisfaction for the US and Israel, but it is improbable to yield sustainable benefits. Alternatively, the UAE’s diplomatic reengagement with Iran, the Saudi-Iran reconciliation facilitated by Beijing, and Oman’s maritime security efforts, particularly on freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, present viable alternatives that may align more favorably with American interests than a militaristic strategy in the coming phase.
ON CHINA IN THE GULF: A TIME OF RECKONING
The second Trump administration must acknowledge the prospects arising from the GCC’s strategic alliances with non-Western powers. Policymakers and experts in the region are increasingly perceiving China’s growing presence as a source of diplomatic influence rather than just economic clout. This shift has understandably elicited concerns in Washington. However, Beijing’s positive legacy of non-interference has enabled it to promote and facilitate de-escalation and a ‘cold peace’ between longstanding adversaries, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia. This de-escalation signifies an increasing confidence in Beijing’s conflict management approach and a diminishing American commitment, capacity, and credibility to maintain regional stability—factors that have further disturbed American observers. The GCC is actively aligning itself with alternative global frameworks, including through engagements in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS group. These actions highlight the GCC states’ transition toward multi-alignment, reinforcing the necessity for a revised US strategy if it wants to maintain its status as the Gulf states’ primary partner.
Nonetheless, these dynamics also offer the US an opportunity to re-establish its influence in the region. A second Trump administration might alter the status quo by emphasizing conflict resolution and revitalizing cross-regional cooperation projects like I2U2 and IMEC. In doing so, Washington may reaffirm its role as a constructive regional actor, promoting an agenda that secures backing not only from the GCC but also throughout the wider region. The US may influence the emerging multi-aligned world by perceiving China’s expanding regional influence not as a danger, but as a stimulus for a new American role. Recent UAE-US collaboration in artificial intelligence illustrates how Washington may engage with GCC nations despite some differences in regional politics and security. If Trump manages to strike a deal that finally ends the war in Gaza, the region’s interests will not fundamentally remain in conflict with those of the US in the medium and long term. Trump’s commitment to addressing crises in the Middle East corresponds with the region’s ambitions and offers a historic chance to forge a new reality. His second term may reinvent America’s role in the Middle East and elevate its standing in the region by formulating an innovative policy that emphasizes security, stability, and inter-regional collaboration.
The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author, and do not represent Fiker Institute.
