The EU’s New Leadership & The Middle East
When the European Commission’s President Ursula von der Leyen took office in 2019, she vowed to make the European Union (EU) a leading actor in confronting global challenges. Now in its second iteration, von der Leyen’s “geopolitical Commission” faces even more pressing worries in an increasingly geopolitical world: the return of Great Power politics has left the EU grappling with its role in the world, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brought war to the EU’s doorstep, and Israel’s war in Gaza has sparked a regional crisis with international ramifications. The European Council’s 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda lays out the EU’s ambition to become a more influential and strategic player and reflects its self-perception as a leader on international norms, justice, and global governance. In the Middle East, however, the EU has appeared increasingly powerless, while its reaction to the events in the region has damaged the credibility of the bloc’s purported rights-based policy. What is EU foreign policy in the Middle East likely to look like under the new EU Commission?
A key figure who will shape European diplomacy in the next five years is Kaja Kallas, former Estonian Prime Minister and veteran Josep Borrell’s successor as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Kallas has a reputation for being a “consensus builder” and a pragmatist – except on Russia-Ukraine where she has staunchly defended Ukraine and consistently advocated a hard line stance on Russia. She has not, however, taken a strong position on the Middle East yet. But the Commission will need to address both the short-term crises in the Middle East and its long-term strategic relations with the region for the EU to become the geopolitical actor it claims to be.
THE EU’S ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Despite its long history of engagement with the region, the EU has no unified policy framework for the Middle East. In the EU’s foreign policy thinking, North Africa and the Levant – Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel – are cast as Europe’s “Southern Neighbourhood,” which falls under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Türkiye, as a candidate for EU membership, falls under the EU’s enlargement strategy, despite the virtual standstill in Türkiye’s accession negotiations. Finally, EU policy towards the Arab Gulf states is based on bilateral and multilateral engagements, including the 1989 EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Cooperation Agreement.
Over the past decades, the EU has failed to make use of its leverage in the region, remaining on the sidelines of many of its crises. Moreover, the ENP failed to tackle the sources of popular discontent in the Middle East and, some argue, prioritized stabilizing the state over building societal resilience. First adopted in 2004 and revised in 2011 and 2015, the ENP relied on the strategic assumption that Europe’s southern neighbors were dependent on the bloc, allowing the EU to preach values and impose conditionality in exchange for trade and development assistance. However, the realities of an increasingly multipolar world have led some states to turn towards other powers, like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Türkiye, as well as Russia and China. The EU’s lack of influence in the region has become glaringly apparent in its inability to convince many of the region’s governments to take a hard stance on Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Moreover, internally, the bloc has experienced democratic backsliding, rising populism, and xenophobia which have undermined the credibility of the EU’s self-image as a leading force for democracy and human rights. This has left the EU appearing somewhat unsure of the role it sees for itself.
KEEPING A SEAT AT THE TABLE IN SYRIA
High Representative Kallas took office as the head of the EU’s foreign service within days of a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. At the same time, Syrian opposition forces were advancing on Aleppo in a flash offensive that would lead to the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, barely a week after the official start of the new Commission’s mandate. The collapse of the al-Assad family’s 54-year rule in Syria after 13 years of civil war occurred just as the EU was making gradual indications of reassessing its “three no’s” strategy: no lifting of sanctions, no normalization of relations, and no reconstruction aid without a meaningful political process in Syria. With a transitional government in charge in Damascus, the EU took an approach of cautious optimism. In her initial statement, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen praised al-Assad’s fall, saying it “offers opportunities but is not without risks.” In December 2024, Kallas tasked the head of the EU’s Syria delegation, Michael Ohnmacht, to make contact with Syria’s new leadership but maintained that the revision of the EU’s sanctions regime would depend on seeing “actual steps” from the transitional government led by UN-designated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In a flurry of diplomacy over the following weeks, Kallas attended ministerial meetings in Jordan and Saudi Arabia to discuss the regional and international response to Syria’s transition and held talks with Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States in Rome to discuss possible EU sanctions relief. On the sidelines of the meetings in Riyadh, Kallas also met with Syria’s Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shibani. Meanwhile, Commissioner for Preparedness and Crisis Management Hadja Lahbib met HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus and announced an additional 235 million euros in humanitarian funding.
Pressure had been building both from within and outside the bloc to ease sanctions on Syria to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid and create the conditions for economic recovery. In a major policy shift on January 27, 2025, EU foreign ministers agreed to begin the process of easing the EU’s sanctions regime on Syria. Kallas said the bloc aims “to move fast” but is “ready to reverse the course if the situation worsens.” The exact details and technicalities of sanctions relief will need to be hammered out in the coming weeks. However, the “step-for-step” roadmap reportedly includes easing sanctions in the energy, transport and financial sectors, contingent on developments in Syria and ongoing negotiations in Brussels. The plans also do not cover EU sanctions on Syria’s de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa and HTS.
Though the EU has stepped up its engagement with Syria, the bloc must also contend with domestic tensions, raised by member states who have announced their intentions to send refugees back to Syria. Notably, Austria, barely a day after al-Assad’s fall, called for the deportation of Syrian refugees, while over a dozen European countries temporarily paused applications from Syrian asylum seekers. However, the challenges in Syria remain formidable, with ongoing security risks and what is likely to be a long political transition process. The EU wants a seat at the table to influence the political transition and reconstruction efforts in Syria, however, its window to influence positive change could close if it fails to follow through with comprehensive sanctions relief and substantial economic support when Syria most needs it.
THE EU AND ISRAEL-PALESTINE
While the EU is trying to find its voice on Syria, it has been virtually absent from any meaningful conversation on the Israel-Palestine file and its wider regional implications. Von der Leyen came out staunchly in support of Israel in October 2023 and it took nearly six months for the EU to put out a unified call for a ceasefire in Gaza. Sharp divisions between member states have prevented the EU from taking any meaningful action, despite its own professed commitment to international law and its economic leverage as Israel’s largest trading partner. Kallas’ predecessor, Josep Borrell, drew the ire of the Israeli government when he called to stop arms shipments, impose EU sanctions, and proposed the EU suspend its political dialogue with Israel. In contrast, Kallas’ public stance on Israel-Palestine largely echoed mainstream European talking points: calling for a ceasefire, defending Israel’s “right to defend itself,” and advocating for a two-state solution. While Estonia under Kallas’ watch increased humanitarian aid to Palestinians and generally voted in favor of UN General Assembly resolutions, including supporting Palestine’s full membership at the United Nations, colleagues do not anticipate that she will take a strong stance at an EU level. Instead, she is expected to defer to member states, which is likely to cement the EU’s deadlock on the issue.
The EU’s marginalization on Israel-Palestine is underscored by the lack of EU or European involvement in the ceasefire negotiations led by Qatar, Egypt and the United States. However, the recently concluded ceasefire deal, which came into force on January 19, is only the first step. Global attention will be crucial as Gazans face incalculable challenges to rebuild their lives and infrastructure, and as questions around political futures, accountability, and justice remain unanswered. The day after the ceasefire deal was announced, Mediterranean Commissioner Dubravka Šuica made known plans for a “multi-annual Support Programme” for the Palestinian Authority “based on key reforms.” The Commission also announced an additional 120 million euros in humanitarian aid to Gaza and is reportedly working on a plan to support reconstruction and recovery in cooperation with Gulf states. The EU can play an important role in addressing the dire humanitarian crisis and long-term development needs, but it must also build pressure to pursue accountability and a political process. A continuation of the EU’s political inaction on Israel-Palestine will further compound the perhaps already irretrievable reputational loss the EU has brought upon itself in the Arab and Muslim world and the Global South more broadly.
MANAGING MIGRATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
The EU has struggled with the conflict between its stated human rights priorities and its more realist instincts in the field of migration for a while. “Fortress Europe” has seen a shift towards transactionalism and short-term thinking in its relations with the so-called “Southern Neighbourhood,” particularly since the 2015 crisis in European governance – constructed as a ‘refugee crisis’ – which securitized migration and contributed to the rise of populist right-wing politics across the continent. Faced with instability and conflicts across the Mediterranean in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, the EU sought short-term fixes to the perceived threat of terrorism and migration by externalizing EU border control, notably through the 2016 EU-Türkiye refugee deal and the Migration Compacts with Lebanon and Jordan.
Towards the end of her first mandate, von der Leyen’s Commission continued down this path, signing migration deals with Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt and Lebanon between 2023-2024. The shift to transactionalism has enabled some governments in the region to leverage their capacity to stem migration for financial support. Former High Representative Borrell was largely sidelined from the deals, while member state governments, such as Italy, played an increasingly important role in setting the tone for the EU’s migration policy in the Mediterranean. With the appointment of a dedicated Commissioner charged with implementing a “New Pact for the Mediterranean,” von der Leyen has signaled the strategic importance of the region. Commissioner for the Mediterranean Dubravka Šuica’s mandate, however, could complicate Kallas’ job to coordinate European policy towards the Middle East and North Africa by creating overlapping responsibilities and potentially conflicting personal agendas.
ENERGY SECURITY AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE GULF
Halfway through the first von der Leyen Commission, the EU refocused its efforts on the Gulf file, which had been gathering dust since the conclusion of the 1989 EU-GCC Cooperation Agreement. In 2008, negotiations for a free trade agreement stalled over disagreements on clauses around human rights and environmental standards. Since then, the EU had remained on the sidelines of the geopolitics of the region – with the exception of its role in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran – while Arab Gulf states gained economic and geopolitical influence, especially since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and the regional upheavals of 2011. Moreover, President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 further marginalized the EU in the region.
In 2022, motivated by Europe’s need for alternative energy sources after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its recognition of the Gulf as a strategic maritime area for global trade and security, and the imperative of climate change, the Commission and then High Representative Borrell outlined the EU’s first-ever Gulf strategy. Seeking to build a “stronger and more strategic partnership” with the GCC countries, the strategy outlined several key areas of cooperation focused on trade and economic cooperation, energy security and climate action, development and humanitarian aid, and maritime and regional security. The operationalization of the strategy has faced some hurdles, notably the diverging geopolitical stances on Russia and the impact of “Qatargate”. However, in October 2024, the EU and GCC held their first biennial EU-GCC Summit in Brussels, underscoring their commitment to developing their partnership. The blocs also outlined common positions on various global conflicts, including Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, the Red Sea, Sudan, Somalia, and Iran. While Kallas has not yet taken any public position on the Gulf, the outcomes of the summit point to continued interest on both sides to further develop the partnership between the blocs, though Kallas’ hawkish stance on Russia could cause some friction in Gulf capitals that have continued to engage with Moscow.
THE LIMITATIONS OF EU FOREIGN POLICY
In her mission letter to Kallas, von der Leyen charged the new High Representative with shaping a “more strategic, more assertive and more united” European foreign policy and propelling an EU-Middle East Strategy with a focus on the “day after” in Gaza and implementing a two-state solution. Despite its ambitions, however, the new Commission faces important institutional and political limitations on its foreign policy making. This includes the typical charges of over-bureaucratization and slow decision-making processes in the EU, as well as the institutional infighting between the Commission and the European Council, which creates areas of overlapping authority and incoherence in EU foreign policy making. Most notably, while Kallas is the head of the European External Action Service (EEAS) – the EU’s diplomatic service – final authority over EU foreign policy lies with the European Council, made up of member states’ heads of state and government, and requires unanimity.
At a time when European governments are divided on many foreign policy issues, it has been difficult to achieve consensus, a dynamic further exacerbated by the influence of the rise of far-right parties across Europe. Domestic political polarization on migration and Israel’s war in Gaza, for instance, has made consensus building at the Union-level increasingly difficult. Individual member states have also pursued their own foreign policy agendas on a bilateral basis, at times undermining EU-level policy making. While Kallas may be the face of European diplomacy, she alone cannot shape foreign policy, as the increasing marginalization of former High Representative Borrell during his tenure shows. Moreover, Europe’s scope of action in the region will be influenced by the new U.S. administration under President Donald Trump. While the EU has sought to define a more independent role for itself and become an autonomous geopolitical actor, the U.S.’ capacity to act as a spoiler is significant, particularly on the issues of Israel-Palestine and Iran. Finally, the EEAS faces significant budget cuts that could lead to a downsizing of the EU’s diplomatic representation abroad. While the Commission’s aspiration to become a greater geopolitical player in the world will require the EU to take on a more coherent, strategic, and active role in the Middle East, Kallas will face institutional and political constraints that could curtail her ambition.
The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author, and do not represent Fiker Institute.
