The African Union: Realities & Considerations
What is happening?
Pan-Africanism, put simply, is the belief that people of African descent have common interests and should be unified.1 Pan-Africanist ideas initially started developing circa 1860 and were spread in Afro-diasporic communities across the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Caribbean by leaders like Martin Delany and Alexander Crummell,2 and later through the works of scholars and activists, such as W.E.B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey.3 These ideals came to fruition institutionally with the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on May 25, 1963, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The main objectives of the Organization were advancing African independence, eradicating colonialism, and promoting solidarity.4 This paramount milestone would have not been achieved without the efforts and active support of intellectuals and leaders across the continent such as Ahmed Sékou Touré, the first president of independent Guinea.5 One of the central arguments that Touré promoted was the idea that African countries should support and collaborate in their struggle against colonialism. Alongside Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, he was among the founding fathers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and brought attention to the struggles faced by African countries to international forums like the United Nations.6 In 1963, upon its founding, Selassie was selected as the first president of the Organization of African Unity (OAU),7 which after almost four decades, and in light of criticisms for its perceived inefficiency and limited capacity to address the continent’s most pressing challenges, was transformed in 2002 into what is known today as the African Union (AU).8
Notwithstanding institutional reforms, the African Union continued to struggle with similar shortcomings as its predecessor over the years, especially the lack of resources and financial sustainability. More recently, in 2021, 65 percent of the total African Union budget was financed by external partners, including the European Union (EU) and individual European states.9 This reliance on external assistance, particularly from European countries, as the main source of funding deems the AU’s programs largely ineffective and takes away from its political legitimacy. Additionally, its role remains primarily limited to coordination rather than enforcement. Notably, the AU does not have a jurisdictional mandate, and instead depends on its member states’ political willingness to implement its policies. More importantly, the AU faces significant challenges in terms of continental security as well. The lack of a centralized military force and the institutional inability of member states to address compounding security threats has hindered the AU’s ability to effectively respond to conflicts and maintain peace in its wider region.
One of the main goals of of the Union’s structural reforms was to overcome the non-interventionist nature of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was enshrined in Article 3 of its founding Charter, which read, “Member States declare and affirm their adherence to the principle of ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of states.’”10 This adjustment was intended to enhance the Union’s ability to maintain peace in the region and guarantee a more secure and stable Africa. However, the continent has been devastated by numerous conflicts and wars with little to no intervention from the African Union since then. A case in point is the South Sudanese Civil War that started in 2013.11 Throughout the seven-year war period, the AU continued issuing threats of sanctions and promises of accountability for the victims, but nothing substantive was implemented.12 This inaction exacerbated the wave of impunity in the country and prolonged bloodshed that could have been avoided with more decisive regional action. The same could be said about the AU’s role in the 2011 Libyan conflict. Despite being the first regional responder to the civil war,13 the AU was sidelined during negotiations, and its efforts were dwarfed by the scale and pace of the conflict, eventually playing a marginal role in the aftermath of the unrest, with some countries attempting to provide assistance on a case-by-case basis.14 The same scenario seems to be unfolding amidst the recent war in Sudan. Aside from suspending the participation of the Republic of Sudan in all AU activities,15 the Union has until now only provided a few vague statements and expressed worry about Sudanese civilians.16
These examples are but a small fraction of the problem. According to the 2023 IEP Global Peace Index, four of the ten least peaceful countries globally are in Africa; the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan.17 Experts count twelve coup attempts in the continent, failed or successful, within the previous two years alone.18 This political instability creates fertile ground for terrorist organizations to be active and sometimes fulfill state capacities. Unfortunately, this represents a harsh reality for countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, ranked among the top ten countries worldwide that are most impacted by terrorism.19 Conditions are worsened as infrastructure is often targeted to advance these organizations’ agendas.20 In a global economic network, where every part of the supply chain has to function like clockwork, the volatile situation in Africa makes it undesirable for foreign investors and multinational corporations, leaving most of the continent behind in terms of economic development. With neither reliable public nor willing private partners, the AU finds itself unable to implement most of its development initiatives, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)21 and the Union Government project.22
It comes as no surprise, then, that poverty reduction in the past couple of decades has been the slowest in these fragile countries. According to the World Bank, while poverty has declined, in percentage terms, from 56 percent in 1990 to 43 percent in 2012, the real number of people living in poverty (on less than $1.90 a day) has increased.23 The Africa Poverty Report outlines that more than 330 million people lived in poverty in 2012, compared to 280 million in 1990.24 When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, it accelerated the rate of impoverishment, reaching 55 million people in an extraordinarily brief period.25 In short, the African continent faces a poverty problem almost nine times the average of the rest of the world, with very limited resources to address its core issues.26 Evidently, extreme poverty is almost always coupled with extreme economic inequality, even in countries that witness substantial economic growth like South Africa; where, despite development, the top decile of the population accounts for 65 percent of national income, compared to the mere six percent amounted to its impoverished bottom half.27 Africa’s economic hardships intertwine with the deeply rooted issue of institutional corruption, creating a complex web of challenges that hampers socioeconomic progress and perpetuates the cycle of inequality in numerous contexts and across multiple fronts.
Why is it happening?
The African Union’s peace and security dilemma remains pertinent today, on account of its inability to effectively address or de-escalate conflicts across the continent. During the Libyan Civil War of 2011, for example, the Union struggled with a lack of consensus among its members. While the official response from the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) condemned the violence and called for a peaceful resolution,28 there was no agreement on what the resolution should look like. South Africa, for instance, whose African National Congress (ANC) received funding and support from the late Libyan leader Muammar Al-Qaddafi in their anti-apartheid struggle,29 favored a peaceful resolution through the dispatch of a special mission by the African Union to Libya.30 The Nigerian government, on the other hand, was hostile to the then Libyan leader and called for immediate action.31 Both of these countries, then non-permanent members of the UN Security Council alongside Gabon, voted in favor of the UN Resolution 1973 that imposed, among other measures, a no-fly zone over Libya, and formed the legal basis for NATO’s military intervention in the country.32 This resolution, which could have been avoided if any of these three countries abstained,33 directly obstructed the African Union’s efforts in Libya. The AU had shortly before established an ad hoc committee whose delegation was planned to fly from Mauritania to Libya. However, the no-fly zone had already entered into effect, and the committee received a message from the US and the UN stating that, “should they proceed with their visit, their security could not be guaranteed.”34 This example outlines the three main failures of the AU. Firstly, the disharmonious foreign policy gaps between the Union and its member states; secondly, the Union’s inability to swiftly and adequately engage in diplomatic missions within its own proclaimed jurisdiction; and, lastly, the constant intervention of other widely supported international organizations such as the UN and NATO.
Similarly to their international counterparts, the nature of regional organizations present another challenge to the AU’s mandate. Better coordinated and more politically aligned organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC), tend to lead more effective economic and security interventions in their respective contexts. For example, during the political crisis in Mali in 2012, ECOWAS took the lead in addressing the situation by deploying a regional military force, known as The African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), to restore stability.35 This action bypassed the African Union’s efforts to mediate the crisis and showcased ECOWAS’ regional leadership in conflict resolution. Most recently, and in the aftermath of the coup d’état in Niger in July 2023, “ECOWAS member states suspended relations with Niger and closed their land and air borders with the country.”36 This constitutes another display of effective coordinated diplomatic and political action by the organization.
Furthermore, these regional actors often possess more focused policy agendas and may prioritize regional integration over pan-African initiatives. For instance, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) establishing its own Free Trade Area37 and the East African Community (EAC) implementing its Single Customs Territory,38 show that smaller regional initiatives mature much quicker than continental projects, and while they contribute towards bigger scale integration, they assert the autonomy of local institutions as agents for successful development. Consequently, however, these can lead to conflicts or diverging interests with the broader goals of the African Union. Arguably, the hindering of the Union’s evolvement, which manifested into ineffective economic and political responses to continental concerns, propelled the formation of said alternate regional organizations. Their cyclical consequence, further deeming the AU inefficient, continues to weaken the Union’s authority today.
What is being done about it?
In efforts to strengthen the AU’s legitimacy and effectiveness, its member states established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which serves as a comprehensive long-term structure to regulate and coordinate the continent-wide security apparatus. Since APSA’s inception in December 2003 and ratification in January 2004 as part of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council,39 the initiative has been coined as “one of the most important recent developments in Africa.”40 The most promising tool introduced by the framework is the regionalization of peace and security in managing conflicts on the continent. The Union is trying to take advantage of the proximity of regional actors and their rapid ability to respond and deploy resources, which gives them a competitive advantage regarding internal conflicts, unlike more traditional intervening actors such as the UN. However, the multiplicity of actors, some argue, in an environment that necessitates delicate coordination and swift action, might complicate matters further and disrupt the flow of information and planning due to crowdedness and opaque delegation of responsibilities.41 Lastly, the AU has developed various subsidiary organs such as the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), and the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) that enable timely identification and response to potential crises, allowing for preventive actions.42
As conflicts on the continent strive to de-escalate or fully resolve, accountability, justice, and human rights are priority pursuits of the African Union and its ongoing institutional reforms. For that reason, firm steps have been taken to expand the jurisdiction of the African Court of Human and People’s Rights (AfCHPR), concentrated on providing capacity-building support to the court to strengthen its operations and efficacy. This includes organizing training programs, workshops, and seminars for judges, lawyers, and other stakeholders involved in human rights litigation.43 In 2004, the protocol governing the court was amended by another protocol that merged the AfCHPR with the African Court of Justice (ACJ) to establish a unified African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which was later adopted in 2008.44 This reform aimed to enhance the new court’s mandate, authority, and efficiency in adjudicating human rights cases across Africa. In 2014, the Malabo Protocol was ratified and further enabled the court to rule on 14 different types of crimes, allowing individuals and NGOs alike to deposit their cases.45
Capacity-building, crucial across several fields within the continent, must take into consideration local contexts when adopted, rather than being implemented widely. Accordingly, with the rise of the pan-African movement and the establishment of the OAU, the Africanization of higher education was a key priority that continued through the AU’s mandate.46 To that end, an entire institutional architecture had to be put in place. Gradually, regional and subregional organizations such as the Association of African Universities, the Consortium for Advanced Research in Africa, the Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa, and the Southern African Quality Assurance Network have been established to aid in this effort.47 On a functional level, the 1981 Arusha Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications in Higher Education in Africa, alongside the AU’s strategy in 2007 for the harmonization of higher education, were milestones along the Tuning Africa initiative, which aims to unify and develop the curriculum.48 In order to foster more intracontinental mobility, a plethora of collaborative programs were also introduced throughout the continent; the Pan African University, the Mwalimu Nyerere Scholarship Scholarship Scheme, and the Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme, to name a few.49
Likewise to education, agriculture is at the forefront of the AU’s development program. The 2002 meeting between the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) recognized that “agriculture has the potential to make a major contribution to reversing this state of affairs,”50 referring to the economic stagnation of the continent as stated in the Abuja Declaration. This sets in motion the forming of two cornerstone commitments by the African Union. The first is the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) and the second is a call on member states to allocate 10 percent of their national budget annually for agriculture, as mentioned in the 2003 Maputo Declaration.51 This declaration identified key areas of intervention, including land and water management, improving market access, food supply, and agricultural research, promising to achieve a six percent annual agricultural productivity growth.52
What’s next?
The African Union is, undoubtedly, tackling numerous challenges simultaneously across multiple sectors. It is engaging in strengthening its institutions, acting as a catalyst for development, and coordinating regional cooperation endeavors. Currently standing at a critical juncture in the continent’s history, the AU has introduced Agenda 2063 to solidify its vision for the future and create a framework to accelerate its growth. The agenda builds upon previous African development frameworks, such as the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action.53 It aims to capture some of the African Renaissance ideals advocated by leaders like Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa, who sought to revitalize the continent’s political, economic, and cultural spheres.54
Economically, one of the goals of the agenda is to turn the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) into reality, carrying immense potential. By creating a single market of over 1.3 billion people and a combined GDP of more than $3 trillion, it offers significant opportunities for increased investment, job creation, and industrialization.55 The removal of tariff barriers, reduction of non-tariff barriers, and the harmonization of trade rules and regulations are expected to facilitate the movement of goods, services, and investments within Africa, driving economic diversification and development. Coupled with this, the AU’s conception of the future of its educational development is laid out in the Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA). The strategy represents a comprehensive framework to guide and improve education systems across the continent. CESA aims to address African countries’ challenges in providing quality education and promoting human capital development for sustainable socioeconomic growth.56
Despite its ambitious goals, Agenda 2063 faces significant policy hurdles and implementation setbacks. Some argue that it lacks clear implementation mechanisms, adequate funding, and effective monitoring and evaluation procedures. The lengthy timeline also raises concerns about accountability and the need for short-term actionable plans. While Agenda 2063 is a much-needed guiding framework toward a prosperous African future, it must be firmly rooted in an African reality, aware of its nuances, and able to adjust its goals and targets accordingly.
To access the works cited & endnotes, download the full report.
The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author, and do not represent Fiker Institute.
