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Strategic Autonomy & the European Green Deal

Strategic Autonomy & the European Green Deal

Kilian Wirthwein Vega

Introduction 

The 2016 Global Strategy for European Foreign and Security Policy marked the first time the European Union (EU) officially incorporated the concept of “strategic autonomy” into its decision-making framework.1 In the foreword of the report, Federica Mogherini, the then-Vice President of the European Commission, wrote that “[nurturing] the ambition of strategic autonomy” for the EU was “necessary to promote [the Union’s] principles and values.”2 Furthermore, the report listed “an appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy” in a multitude of fields, including energy, as a priority for the EU’s external action.3

This leap towards autonomy stems from the EU’s recent efforts to become a key player in global politics, and achieve the economic and political wherewithal to carry out its foreign policy objectives. In energy specifically, the bloc has sought to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels. This essay examines the EU’s application of strategic autonomy to its green energy capabilities, particularly within the context of the European Green Deal. Then, it proposes several policy recommendations to advance the bloc’s multilateral commitments while preserving its prioritization of strategic autonomy.

The Emergence of Strategic Autonomy 

In 2007, EU member states signed the Treaty of Lisbon, which conferred legal agency to the bloc, thus allowing it to enter into international agreements and join multilateral organizations.4 As the Union advanced on the foreign policy front, several bodies were established to elevate the EU’s status as an international actor. A notable example is the European External Action Service (EEAS), which was launched in 2011 with the mandate of making “EU foreign policy more coherent and effective” in order to “[increase] Europe’s global influence.”5 Another example is the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), established in 2014 under the European Commission.6 The main function of the FPI is the financial management and implementation of Global Europe, or the EU’s Neighborhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument, which dedicates nearly €80 billion to EU cooperation with developing economies.7 The FPI mandate also includes “[helping] countries cope with crises,” “[supporting]…human dignity and the rule of law worldwide,” and “[leveraging] the EU’s influence in the world.”8 In other words, these bodies work to consolidate the EU’s position as a significant actor in global affairs. Alongside other external bodies, such as the Directorate-General for International Partnerships, they also demonstrate the Union’s commitment to increasing its foreign influence. 

Despite these efforts, the EU has experienced decreasing global prominence in the past decade, as well as heightened internal tensions. In this context, strategic autonomy emerged as a central pillar of EU foreign policy. First, the election of former U.S. President Donald Trump raised concerns about whether the EU could continue to rely on its foremost political and economic partner.9 President Trump had made “America First” the central promise of his election campaign, and advocated for isolationist foreign policy moves during his presidential bid.10 Indeed, months into the Trump presidency, the U.S. withdrew from critical multilateral partnerships, including the Paris Climate Agreement.11 Following President Trump’s European visit in May 2017, former Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel declared that “Europe must take [its] fate into [its] own hands,” emphasizing the precarious position the EU found itself in without a solid transatlantic partnership.12

Furthermore, in 2016 and 2017, the EU experienced significant internal dissonance due to the United Kingdom’s (UK) Brexit vote. The UK had been a key player at the EU level, and was deeply integrated with the bloc in terms of trade, investment, and migration.13 For this reason, following the UK’s decision, exit rhetoric gained prominence within other member states as well. In Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, and France, for instance, Eurosceptic political parties began gathering increased popular support, which raised questions about whether further disintegration was in store for the EU.14

Therefore, as the EU faced external and internal uncertainties, strategic autonomy presented a viable framework for strengthening the Union’s international position, on the one hand, and consolidating unity within the bloc, on the other. By advocating for sovereignty in key fields, including energy,15 the EU is able to maintain its policy priorities amidst an increasingly isolationist turn in global politics. Without a strict commitment to autonomy, this approach also allows the EU to participate in transnational partnerships where appropriate, and to continue its advocacy for multilateral action. As such, a term that is gaining relevance for EU policymakers is “open” strategic autonomy, meaning that the focus is on collaborating whenever possible, but the maintenance of certain degrees of sovereignty in critical fields remains a priority.16 In these ways, the strategic autonomy approach significantly increases the EU’s maneuvering capacity on the foreign policy front.

Strategic Autonomy and the European Green Deal 

The domestic and international policy commitments of the European Green Deal illustrate the prominence of strategic autonomy within EU policymaking spheres.17 The deal was first presented by the European Commission, led by President Ursula von der Leyen, in late 2019. An ambitious roadmap, it proposes that Europe becomes climate neutral by 2050, thus making it the first continent in the world to do so.18 For this purpose, the plan contains 50 specific policy measures in a multitude of domains, including biodiversity, farming, mineral-based industries, transportation, and recycling.19 In addition, the Green Deal lays out an economic strategy that promotes the growth of the European market while facilitating the transition to a sustainable economic model. Throughout the green transition, the plan emphasizes that “no one will be left behind,” meaning that the economies that are reliant on fossil fuels will receive significant subsidies from the Union to supplement the transition.20 To facilitate this process, the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) was established in 2020, which will mobilize around €55 billion by 2027 to “alleviate the socio-economic impact of the transition.”21 Simply put, the European Green Deal is an economic strategy as much as an action plan for fighting climate change.

Moreover, the strategic autonomy approach is evident in the EU’s intention to achieve the economic capacity to implement the policy objectives of the deal, as well as to advance international partnerships with a united, EU-wide voice. First, the EU has proposed to accelerate the green energy transition process in order to attain greater independence from gas and oil exports.22 For context, the EU’s energy dependence rate for solid fossil fuels, natural gas, and crude oil has increased from 56.3% in 2000 to 57.5% in 2020.23 Although this increase might appear to be slight, it occurred while a multitude of initiatives and policy reforms were implemented to increase renewable energy production and consumption throughout the bloc.24 In other words, it represents the continent’s persistent dependence on energy imports. For this reason, the European Green Deal multiplies efforts to reach autonomy in the energy domain. The deal’s main objective is to increase the green energy mix and to produce clean energy within the Union, especially through technologies such as solar and wind energy.25

Relatedly, a current debate at EU institutions considers whether gas and nuclear technology should be labeled as clean energy. While countries like France have argued that nuclear technology could help produce greener energy with fewer costs involved,26 those like Germany have preferred to push for wind and solar energy.27 The importance of maintaining strategic autonomy for EU institutions is evidenced by the compromise that has been reached on this matter. In the past, achieving unanimity on nuclear energy had been particularly challenging, especially due to the influence of powerful member states like Germany, which oppose nuclear activities in the Union. However, in a July 2022 vote, the European Parliament did not object to the European Commission’s Taxonomy Delegated Act, which included certain nuclear energy and natural gas activities as environmentally sustainable economic practices.28 This indicates that for EU bodies, reaching the economic capacity to unilaterally act on the Union’s policy objectives, especially in the green energy field, is being prioritized. In fact, Thierry Breton, the Commissioner for the Internal Market, has argued that nuclear technology would be key to promoting the EU’s strategic autonomy in the field of green energy.29

Another area where the strategic autonomy approach is deeply enshrined in the European Green Deal is the proposal for the creation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), also known as the carbon tax. Significantly, the CBAM is the first EU-wide policy decision that directly ties trade policy to climate action.30 It would tax imported goods—specifically, cement, aluminum, fertilizers, electric energy production, iron, and steel—based on how carbon-intensive their production is.31

Alongside the EU’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the CBAM would thus ensure that fossil fuel imports are not at a comparative advantage over products manufactured in the EU due to less strict carbon regulations in a majority of countries.32 Therefore, from an institutional point of view, the CBAM stands to shift foreign policy decisions from national legislation to the EU level, while creating a strong trade instrument vis-à-vis other global players in the energy sphere. As production standards and certification schemes play a central role in shaping what external actors are allowed to export into the bloc, EU-wide green standards and regulations affect the capacity of foreign players to operate in the European internal market. As such, these regulations allow the EU to set conditions for external actors that are in line with the Union’s public priorities, primarily, with the objectives of the European Green Deal. In addition, it elevates the EU’s positionality as a strong regulator of trade in international markets.

The Way Forward 

The EU can take further steps to advance the integration of the Green Deal’s policy objectives into the Union’s strategic autonomy approach in the foreign policy domain. A balanced outlook is recommended, as the success of its green policies is largely dependent on the capacity of the international community to implement global agreements.

The European Union would benefit from placing greater emphasis on open strategic autonomy, rather than implementing a more inward-looking approach to strictly preserve its sovereignty in key fields. As well as keeping in line with the EU’s historic promotion of multilateralism, this adjusted approach would allow for more flexibility regarding where greater sovereignty would be beneficial, and where cooperation and joint approaches make more sense in terms of efficiency and long-term impact. On this front, the guiding principle could be to minimize closure and self-reliance whenever possible, and instead continue to consider the benefits and the downsides of seeking autonomy on a case-by-case basis. More specifically, the EU could determine this on the principle of proportionality, and aim to pursue openness as long as no critical interests, such as cybersecurity, are at play. 

The EU could also aim for a sector-specific approach to strategic autonomy. The European Commission would benefit from laying out the policy areas where greater autonomy is beneficial, as well as the areas in which self-reliance would be detrimental. This would accelerate achieving a balanced approach on the foreign policy front, which aims to enhance the capacity of the EU to act internationally while curbing undesirable dependencies at the same time. 

In the sphere of green policy and climate diplomacy, the EU should actively look for new partners for innovative cross-border projects, especially with other countries that are like-minded on issues such as the reduction of carbon emissions and the promotion of green energy projects. The United Arab Emirates could be a key partner in this respect, especially ahead of COP28.

Going forward, strategic autonomy should be understood as a diversification effort. In a complex geopolitical world order, it is common that relationships between nations fluctuate depending on short and medium-term developments. However, the EU, and its partners, should preserve a long-term view, understanding that the best approach is to diversify all sources of cooperation in order to minimize the risk of strategic vulnerabilities.

To access the endnotes, download the full report.

The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author, and do not represent Fiker Institute.

Kilian Wirthwein Vega
Kilian Wirthwein Vega
Kilian Wirthwein Vega is a nonresident fellow at Fiker Institute’s Europe Programme. He is also a Consultant, covering EU politics at Teneo. He holds an MSc in Conflict Studies from the London School of Economics, and an MSc in Global Governance and Diplomacy from the University of Oxford.