Reading Edward Said Today: Syria & the Orientalist Rhetoric
INTRODUCTION
Forty-seven years have passed since Edward Said published his masterpiece Orientalism in 1978, revolutionizing the realm of social science and putting forward a theoretical framework that attempted to explain how the West constructed the idea of the ‘Orient’ as exotic, uncivilized, and inferior, while seeking to establish hegemonic claims over it. Said criticizes the thinking exemplified by Rudyard Kipling’s The White Man’s Burden, published in 1899, which emphasized the West’s duty to ‘civilize’ the ‘uncivilized’ East. Centuries later, this so-called ‘burden’ is still simultaneously present in both literary production and global politics, which continue to draw lines between ‘us’, meaning the West, and ‘them’ in the East.
While the term Orient has been used to describe countries in East and South Asia, Said mainly focused on how it was used in relation to the Arab people and the Arab World at large, a space that has historically been cast as an object in the struggle for hegemony.1 The Iraq invasion of 2003, the Syrian war of 2011, and the Gaza war of 2023 mark turning points in the history of the region which have reshaped the geopolitical context and reproduced Orientalist narratives across different mediums and platforms. It is therefore instructive to revisit Edward Said’s Orientalism precisely at this point in time, as it remains pertinent to the understanding of the contemporary regional context and how it is both perceived and portrayed.
This Essay aims to contextualize Said’s work within the current political moment in our region. It will focus on the case of contemporary Syria as a striking example of Orientalist imperial and colonial legacies, totalitarian history, and post-conflict dynamics. The Essay will explore, through Said’s theoretical lens, the persistence of Orientalist practices as they relate to Syria, and the continued manipulation of Orientalist discourses as tools of control.
THE MAKING OF THE ‘OTHER’: ORIENTALISM AS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The legacy of Said continues to influence scholarship and provoke critical debates to this day. Said’s intellectual background and personal experiences as an ‘Oriental’—born in Palestine, spending his childhood in Egypt and Lebanon, and later educated in the United States (US) where he established a distinguished career—gave him the perspective of an insider and made him the ideal spokesperson for the concept itself.2 His critique of the Western essentialist representations of the Orient triggered a paradigm shift across diverse disciplines, from anthropology to political science and literary studies. It is also considered a “cornerstone” for the field of post-colonial studies.3
Said considers Orientalism to be “a book about culture, ideas, history, and power.”4 The central thesis in his iconic volume questions the relationship between knowledge production, hegemony, and the colonial discourse.5 Orientalism’s theoretical framework borrows from French philosopher Michel Foucault’s theories of discourse and Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony.6 Said applies Foucault’s ideas to develop a solid framework that explains how representations are influenced by systems of power and how knowledge production manufactures “truth” about the subjects studied.7 Said argues that the use of authoritative discourse by Western academia created and then exploited a problematic view of the Orient while enabling imperialism. He further drew on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to explain the construction of the superiority of Europeans, which identifies a European ‘us’ as superior to the non-European ‘them’.8 The result of this interrelation, Said argues, is the construction of the Orient as the binary opposite of the Occident.
In the introduction to his book, Said offers three overlapping definitions of Orientalism. First, he describes an Orientalist as “anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient.”9 Second, he defines Orientalism as a “style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ […] and ‘the Occident.’”10 Finally, and in this context most crucially, Said notes that Orientalism can be seen as “the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, by authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.”11
These three definitions are underpinned by questions of representation, knowledge, power, and perceived Western superiority in literature, scholarship, and media. For example, Said argues that in film and television, “the Arab is associated either with lechery or bloodthirsty dishonesty.”12 This is portrayed in films such as The Sheik (1921), Lawrence of Arabia (1962), American Sniper (2014) and Jack Ryan (2018).13 In these four productions, set in different centuries and political contexts, Arabs are represented as inferior, subservient, and subject to tribal and sectarian systems. More importantly, they are portrayed as being dependent on the Occident as their savior and protector. The dichotomy of Western superiority and Oriental inferiority create racist stereotypes which align with a worldview that justifies Western colonialism.
SYRIA AND THE EVOLUTION OF ORIENTALISM
In the introduction to Orientalism, Said posed a critical question: “How does Orientalism transmit or reproduce itself from one epoch to another?”14 With its tumultuous past and present, from imperialism (during the Ottoman Empire) to colonialism (during the French occupation) to authoritarianism (under the Assad regime), and post-authoritarianism (after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024), Syria provides an interesting example of how Orientalism evolves across different eras and within different geopolitical contexts.
Historically, Syria has been caught in the struggle for power. The ruins of ancient citadels spread across Syria serve as fascinating indicators of the rise and fall of many empires: the Assyrians, Romans, Turks, and Greeks, among others.15 Damascus, the “oldest inhabited city”16 in the world, was the capital of the Aramaeans around 1100 BCE and played a key role in the Umayyad dynasty in the seventh and eighth centuries, which stretched from Iran in the east to Spain in the west.17 Western hegemonic interests in Syria can be traced back to the mid-19th century, during the late Ottoman era, when colonial powers, notably France and Britain, sought to maximize their influence. Their colonial efforts were underpinned by an Orientalist perception of Syrians as divided along sectarian lines. To justify their colonial interests following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, France and Britain created the mandate system as a legitimating tool for hegemony over the Orient. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, which set the post-war framework, the term ‘mandate’ was coined to justify the occupation of Syria and other parts of the Arab world by France and Britain.
These colonial policies towards Syria hindered the emergence of a democratic state after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, despite efforts by the Arab leader, Faisal ibn al-Hussein, the son of Sharif Hussein ibn Ali al-Hashimi, leader of the Arab revolt, to secure self-determination for Syrians. Despite numerous flaws and controversies surrounding Sharifian politics, Faisal challenged the binary of the ‘civilized’ Occident and the ‘uncivilized’ Orient while seeking to assert the status of Syrians as free people.18 In February 1919 at the Peace Conference in Paris, Faisal addressed British, French and the American statesmen: “‘My nation has a great civilization. When my nation was civilized, the nations you represent were still barbaric and savage, I ask you not to demean this nation that has truly served civilization.’”19 However, his passionate speech did not prevent the press at the time from portraying Faisal as exotic, medieval, and savage, unfit to be a member of the League of Nations.20
In the colonial and imperialist powers’ Orientalist logic, the Syrian people lacked the capacity for self-rule and needed the guardianship of the West. In July 1920, French troops marched into Syrian cities and expelled Faisal, starting a quarter-century of occupation. During its rule over Syria, France sowed the seeds of sectarianism by deploying divide-and-rule policies, granting selective administrative autonomy, and manipulating religious groups such as the ‘minority’ Christians, Alawites, and Druze.21 Twenty-five years later, on April 17, 1946, the last French soldier left Syrian territory, leaving the fledgling Republic with much hope but also the bitter legacy of imperialism and colonialism that profoundly influenced state-building. A period of power struggles between various military factions followed independence, culminating in a chain of coups d’état from 1949 to 1970. The final coup in 1970 brought Hafiz al-Assad to power, who established an authoritarian regime that endured for over five decades, ruled first himself, and from 2000 onwards, by his son, Bashar al-Assad.22
During these epochs, Orientalist policies persisted in various forms, implemented by different players. The post-Second World War geopolitical context shifted the power from the imperial duo, Britain and France—who had conquered, divided, and controlled the region for a century—to the US, which emerged as a new superpower inheriting, in Said’s words, a “massive, quasi-material knowledge stored in the annals of modern European Orientalism.”23
While Orientalism from the late 18th century (since Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt) to the late 20th century was intertwined with imperialism and colonialism, in the 21st century, it has been shaped by the war on terror and neo-colonial discourse. The aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks reshaped global politics and unleashed a new wave of Orientalism, with discourses that legitimized and normalized assumptions about the Orient. In the words of then-US President George W. Bush, although the 9/11 “attack took place on American soil, […] it was an attack on the heart and soul of the civilized world.”24 On March 19, 2003, Bush addressed the American nation from the Oval Office, announcing the invasion of Iraq, or what was dubbed ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom.’ He said: “To all the men and women of the United States Armed Forces now in the Middle East, the peace of a troubled world and the hopes of an oppressed people now depend on you.”25 Accordingly, the Occident was cast not only as superior but also as the savior of the Orient. This binary situates the Occident in opposition to the Orient—civilized vs. barbaric, good vs. evil, the liberal model of the West vs. the terrorist, backward East.
SYRIAN REVOLUTION: A CONTINUOUS REPRODUCTION OF ORIENTALIST TROPES
In his concluding chapter, Said rightly predicts that “circumstances making Orientalism a continuingly persuasive type of thought will persist.”26 During the course of the Syrian uprising (2011–2024), Syria experienced a new wave of Orientalization through an essentialist discourse deeply influenced by colonialism. This mirrors 20th-century dynamics, though it is underpinned by different geopolitical circumstances.
On March 15, 2011, within the context of the Arab Spring, Syrians took to the streets demanding regime change. However, the violent response from Assad’s forces transformed a peaceful movement into a multi-layered conflict, resulting in over 600,000 deaths, the displacement of over half the population, and deep national divisions.27 The West adopted a reductionist approach to the uprising, revealing numerous cultural assumptions and Orientalist tropes: the incompatibility of Arabs with democracy, their propensity for religious extremism, and their inherent oppression of women.28 Bernard Lewis, the infamous American Orientalist, explicitly argued at the onset of the Arab uprisings in 2011 that democracy was “a political concept that has no history, no record” in the region, saying: “They [Arabs and Muslims] are simply not ready for free and fair elections.”29
Building on this Orientalist framework, many analysts and scholars have redefined the so-called Arab Spring as the “Islamist ‘Winter’”, which they described as “highly reactionary” and “ideological”.30 There was a prevailing belief that the region was inclined toward radicalism and incapable of democratic transition if left to its own devices.31 This view was encapsulated by then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s speech in 2011, in which she questioned whether the people of the region would “make the most of this historic moment or fall back into stagnation.”32 She further questioned their ability to address “the region’s most pressing challenges—to diversify their economies, open their political systems, crack down on corruption, [and] respect the rights of all their citizens, including women and minorities.”33 Clinton’s statement explicitly made the West the benchmark for democracy, the ideal model which those in the Orient should strive to emulate.
Such Orientalist tropes also persisted in media and film produced since the Arab uprisings. Jack Ryan (2018), an Amazon Video action series, is a prime example of Western Orientalist rhetoric in cinematography.34 The eight-episode program follows Jack Ryan, a CIA agent, battling Suleiman, a Syrian leader of a terrorist cell. Suleiman and his followers are portrayed as disheveled, dusty, and barbaric, reinforcing their backwardness and danger.35 The show transitions from urban Paris and Washington to yellow-filtered desert scenes, where Ryan embarks on a mission to track down terrorists and save Suleiman’s wife, Hanin, and her daughters.36 The portrayal of Ryan emphasizes American superiority while reducing the Orient to a dangerous, threatening ‘Other’.
This stereotype was also plain in the rhetoric around Syrian refugees. The Syrian conflict triggered the world’s largest refugee crisis, as millions of Syrians were forced to flee their homes.37 Horrific images of dead bodies floating in the Mediterranean while attempting to escape the war shocked the world. Yet, Western coverage of the Syrian refugee crisis often framed it in Orientalist terms, dehumanizing Syrians as ‘Others’. During his first term in 2017, President Donald Trump banned Syrian refugees and ordered Syrians in the US to be deported, perpetuating stereotypes that Muslims are backward and violent, particularly implying that Syrian Muslims might be terrorists.38
The contrasting European media coverage of Ukrainian refugees following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 further emphasizes this depiction. For example, French journalist Philippe Corbé of BFM TV, while commenting on Ukrainian refugees, remarked: “‘We’re not talking here about Syrians fleeing the bombing of the Syrian regime backed by Putin. We’re talking about Europeans leaving in cars that look like ours to save their lives.’”39 Similarly, an ITV journalist described the Ukrainian refugee crisis by stating: “‘Now the unthinkable has happened to them. And this is not a developing, third-world nation. This is Europe!’”40 Such statements reflect a lament for the suffering of the ‘civilized’ West, even as they diminish the significance of Syrian suffering.
In sum, what happened in Syria has not only been a humanitarian disaster and a political conflict, but also a powerful stimulus for the reproduction of Orientalist narratives, influencing both public opinion and policymaking toward the region and its people.
POST-ASSAD SYRIA: MINORITY RIGHTS & FEMINISM AS NEO-ORIENTALIST TROPES
The date of Bashar al-Assad’s escape from Syria on 8th December 2024 after a flash campaign by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) will remain in Syrians’ collective memory. It brought a dramatic end to half a century of the Assad dynasty’s rule.41 The end of the regime represented a moment of jubilation for countless Syrians. More significantly, it presents Syria with a great opportunity for state-building.
Many in the West, however, have framed the regime change in Syria as being driven primarily by competing sectarian identities and view it as inherently incapable of democracy. That said, it is important to acknowledge the existence of a sectarian question in Syria outside of the Western framing of internal Syrian dynamics. Sectarian clashes erupted in early March 2025, in the Alawite’s heartland, northwest Syria, where pro-Assad militias targeted security checkpoints, killing scores and spreading violence to other coastal towns and cities.42 Assad loyalists kidnapped and killed members of the security forces in Latakia and Tartus—areas with predominantly Alawite populations.43 The Syrian Network for Human Rights reported that, in retaliation, government forces and allied militias arrived from Idlib and carried out collective punishments against Alawite families, killing hundreds.44 These incidents reflect deep-rooted identity conflicts, which are part of the legacy left by the Assad regime. However, the identity question in Syria is not merely a recent phenomenon—it is rooted in the country’s broader historical experience of colonialism, authoritarianism, and the rise of political Islam. These issues now present significant challenges for the new leadership attempting to build a democratic future.45 Nonetheless, the argument stands that the dominant Western approach to Syria has been shaped by an Orientalist perspective, which oversimplifies the conflict by reducing it to sectarianism and undermines the agency and democratic aspirations of the Syrian people.
Within 24 hours of Assad’s ousting, three major media outlets in the US published articles with almost the same titles and conclusions, focusing on the ‘winners and losers’ in post-Assad Syria. All three articles identified minority groups and women among the key losers. In Politico’s article titled Assad’s downfall – the winners and losers, the author highlights the concerns of Kurds and Alawites, noting how the Alawites “have long feared that if their co-religionist Bashar Assad was toppled they would be made to suffer” and, despite efforts by HTS to protect the Alawite community, there is a deep-seated “thirst for revenge.”46 Nicholas Kristof, writing for The New York Times, also expressed particular concern for the Alawites, stating that: “I would be terrified if I were an Alawite in Syria today,” while also warning that Christians and women could face harassment and a loss of rights.47 Newsweek echoed this sentiment, emphasizing that “the risks are high, Syria could follow in the footsteps of Lebanon, Yemen, or Iraq.”48 By the same token, on 9th December 2024, CNN hosted US Lieutenant General Mark Hertling to discuss the developments in Syria. Comparing the occupation of Iraq with the situation in Syria, Hertling made sweeping generalizations about the region, stating: “There is such a dynamic of culture in all of these Middle Eastern countries, Iraq, Iran, Syria, but especially Syria. You know, you have so many different cults, so many different religions […] You just have the potential for the kind of chaos that we saw in Iraq […] You could have that same kind of action.”49
The Orientalist discourse expressed in British media outlets such as The Guardian, The Independent, and The Economist parallels that of American sources by focusing on the fate of minorities in a post-Assad Syria.50 Furthermore, ten days after the regime’s collapse, BBC’s Jeremy Bowen interviewed now-Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Damascus, focusing on issues related to minorities, Islamization, and women’s rights. The first questions Bowen asked al-Sharaa were embedded in Orientalist thinking: “You’ve made a lot of promises. You said that you will respect the mosaic of different sectarian groups here in Syria. Minorities as well. Are you going to keep those promises? […] So, this isn’t going to be some kind of a caliphate? Or you’re not going to make Syria into a country like Afghanistan […]? So, the culture of Syria includes rights for women, it includes education for women, it includes tolerance for people drinking alcohol. Is that all acceptable to you?”51 A few weeks later, during the World Economic Forum in January 2025, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair interviewed Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hasan al-Shaibani, where questions again centered on women’s and minority rights. Blair—who led the UK into the 2003 invasion of Iraq under false claims of Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, a conflict that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis—questioned whether post-Assad Syria would align with so-called Western values: “It’s a question of how you also persuade people that when they lift the sanctions, that’s going to be helping promote a country with the values that people believe are the right ones for the future.”52
Similarly, the sensationalized media coverage of the official visits by French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot and his German counterpart Annalena Baerbock to Syria, in which they met with al-Sharaa, were underpinned by similar narratives. The meeting generated significant attention when al-Sharaa extended his hand to Barrot but not to Baerbock, placing it on his chest instead. This gesture sparked backlash in the European media, with critics extrapolating from the incident wider accusations towards the Syrian leadership of reinforcing an Islamic identity at the expense of women’s rights. The Politico article titled Handshake-gate in Syria captured the controversy, with the author noting that Baerbock went there to “advocate the rights of women and minorities. She left without a handshake.”53
Western supremacy has been evident in both discourse and policy in reaction to the regime change in Syria which has perpetuated the assumption that the transition would descend into anarchy.
CONCLUSION
Edward Said’s masterpiece did not offer solutions to Orientalism, though he acknowledged that his primary aim was to “describe a particular system of ideas” and illuminate Orientalism as a political and cultural phenomenon rooted in historical experience.54 As this Essay sought to explain, Orientalism has persisted throughout Syria’s history, intertwined with imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and continuing through the conflict and post-conflict eras. In each epoch, Orientalism is transmitted within different circumstances and geopolitical variables. However, tropes of Western superiority and representations of Syrians as a people in need of guidance toward a rational, enlightened Western model persist.
After 55 years of suffering under the rule of the Assad family, Syria and its people now stand at a crossroads, with a great opportunity for a brighter future. Certainly, there are various internal and external challenges to state-building, one of which is dismantling the Orientalist project and countering the persistent Orientalist rhetoric.
Three pillars are critical to this de-Orientalization: intellectuals, policymakers, and civil society. Mediators of knowledge, including think tanks, scholars, and universities, play a significant role in deconstructing Orientalism through knowledge production. Policymakers and political leaders can counter hegemonic efforts by forging new alliances with key Arab states to strengthen Syria’s geopolitical position. Finally, civil society’s role is critical in producing grassroots discourse which interacts with top-down narratives, especially in the modern context of digitalization, artificial intelligence, and social media, where borders are erased and traditional knowledge production is challenged. The role of younger generations is important in this context. Shortly after the ousting of Assad, members of civil society became active on the ground, maintaining civil peace, countering sectarian discourse, and striving to restore order. Just hours after Assad’s toppling, videos of young men and women in their early twenties cleaning streets in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and other cities, painting graffiti promoting national unity, and distributing flowers and food to members of the armed forces offered a glimpse of hope.
In the final paragraph of Orientalism, Said writes: “The worldwide hegemony of Orientalism and all it stands for can now be challenged. […] If this book has any future use, it will be as a modest contribution to that challenge.”55 At this historical moment, more than ever, Syrians need to challenge the Orientalist narrative and dismantle the Orient/Occident binary.
The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author, and do not represent Fiker Institute. To access the endnotes, download the PDF.
