Post-Pandemic Diplomacy: Is the future remote?
Introduction
In recent years, digital diplomacy has been broadly defined as either the use of digital platforms by institutions or practitioners of diplomacy or as the transfer of diplomatic practices from physical to digital settings. Prior to the pandemic, practicing diplomacy remotely, from the comfort of a diplomat’s home, seemed to be an idiosyncratic concept: How could it be possible to fully digitize a field that is built on the tactful management of dialogue and the sensitive balancing of multilateral interests? Would it be possible to re-create in the digital realm moments of informal, yet critical, dialogue between state representatives? How much diplomatic eloquence and dexterity would be lost in ‘digital’ translation? Most significantly, how could state representatives from countries without extensive internet infrastructure gain regular access to platforms of digital diplomacy?1
Now, two years into the pandemic, these questions are no longer rhetorical, and ‘Zoomplomacy’2 and WhatsApp negotiations have become standard practice. The loss of in-person interactions during the pandemic added agility and ingenuity to the field, and the lessons deduced from these unprecedented times will significantly reshape the future of diplomatic relations, in both bilateral and multilateral settings. What has the international community learned about the relevance of traditional diplomatic practices since going remote, and how can these practices be better utilized in the post-pandemic era?
Background
When considered in the specific context of this pandemic, digital diplomacy appears to be a novel practice, emerging out of necessity in a time when in-person gatherings were impeded. Although it is safe to assume that digital diplomacy has reached its peak in the past two years, the use of digital spaces by diplomatic institutions has been a developing practice since the early 2000s.
For the past two decades, foreign ministries have slowly, but increasingly, adopted digital practices, and capitalized on social networking sites, blogs, and mobile applications to advance their work. Since these institutions’ key functions already included networking, influencing, and information gathering, the use of digital tools for the same purposes was regarded as simply the digitization of traditional diplomatic practices.3 The most notable shift to the practice of digital diplomacy came with the widespread use of online messaging platforms circa 2010. Before the extensive use of these platforms, delegates at the United Nations, for example, would have to leave in the middle of negotiations to phone their capitals and request guidance on international policy decisions.4
Popularized during the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, conducting diplomatic negotiations through WhatsApp, which has been termed ‘WhatsApp diplomacy,’ has since been a significant tool of diplomatic practice.5
This is why digital diplomacy has, to both scholars and practitioners alike, long represented the mere digitization of some existing traditional models within the field. The limitations imposed on in-person gatherings during the pandemic have, on the other hand, questioned the validity of this narrow definition. The incorporation of new technologies to operational structures of diplomatic institutions, and the uses of virtual communication platforms during, and sometimes for, political negotiations, have been amplified by the transition of nearly all diplomatic practices to a fully remote and virtual format in the past two years. As such, digital diplomacy no longer denotes the mere digitization of a few traditional functions of diplomacy, but also the practice of conducting all diplomatic activities virtually and remotely, through teleconferencing and other digital communication platforms.
Discussion
The most notable impact of conducting diplomatic functions from remote settings during the pandemic has been the ability to transgress geographic limitations. Ordinarily, diplomatic meetings, both bilateral and multilateral, would entail travel to a predetermined, neutral destination for all relevant parties involved. In practice, this could mean arranging for accommodation and transportation, which can be both costly and time-consuming. However, the ability to meet virtually means that political meetings can attain geographic and cultural balance, and those typically underrepresented in diplomatic conversations, due to lack of travel and accommodation funds, can have a virtual seat on the table. This is evidenced by the number of states that participated in the 2021 General Assembly session of the United Nations. Typically, around 70 to 80 heads of state are present for the in-person General Debate, which is held at the beginning of the General Assembly in September of each year. However, the 2021 General Debate, conducted virtually, saw 119 Heads of State and 54 Heads of Government speak through pre-recorded video statements – the highest number of speakers to date.6 In this sense, multilateral diplomacy, when conducted virtually, can encourage greater geographic and cultural representation on the international stage.
Furthermore, venue availability and related logistical concerns can inhibit the organization of large-scale, in-person diplomatic gatherings, and thus, incentivize host governments or institutions to only invite key actors to multilateral meetings. However, since virtual meeting rooms can hold tens, even hundreds of participants with no significant burden to the host entity, the need to limit invitations only to key state actors, such as ambassadors, is eliminated. In this way, stakeholders other than state actors, such as members of non-governmental organizations, civil society, and academic institutions, can actively participate in diplomatic discussions and negotiations. By enabling the presence of non-state actors during diplomatic processes, digital technologies increase transparency and inclusivity in the field, which has traditionally been a secluded forum for both bilateral and multilateral decision-making. Such diversity of opinion encourages better resolutions and outcomes by allowing for wider public engagement on critical issues.
While digital diplomacy allows for greater representation on the international stage, and advances inclusion in diplomatic practices, only those with access to the necessary technology and web infrastructure can benefit from such developments. Thus, digital diplomacy practices inherently exclude the populations without access to an extensive and functional network of technological hardware, as well as the know-how to utilize and develop these foundations. Although use of, and access to, the internet may appear mainstream, at the start of 2020, 3.7 billion people, around half of the world’s population, were fully ‘offline’.7 Furthermore, internet access, especially in low- and middle-income countries, is characterized by a significant gender divide.
In 2020, women globally were 20% less likely to use mobile internet than men. This gender gap is most pronounced in South Asia with 51%, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with the second largest gender gap at 37%.8 Hence, due to the lack of access to the internet, digital diplomacy practices disadvantage those in low- and middle-income countries, and especially women in developing economies.
Another challenge facing the widespread adoption of digital diplomacy is how virtual spaces inhibit one of the most decisive interactions between state representatives: informal dialogue. The lack of casual interactions between state representatives, such as at one of the United Nations’ coffee stations, can stand in the way of forming interpersonal relationships and establishing personal networks. On this point, the American Foreign Service Association has shared the pandemic experiences of two Washington-based diplomats. One of them expressed “feeling lucky” to have started his post one year before the pandemic, as he was able to fully rely on the network of personal contacts that he had established before in-person diplomacy was put on hold. The second diplomat, however, arrived in Washington just before the pandemic started, and reported that he had “no real relationships, and certainly no new friendships.”9 Considering that the success of transnational diplomacy is heavily informed by the professional networks and personal relationships of state representatives, it would be difficult to make the case for fully digitalizing a field that, to a large extent, thrives on informal dialogue and candid moments in between official functions.
The use of digital technology showcased increased potential for inclusivity and accessibility to the modus operandi of diplomatic relations. Even after the full return of in-person diplomacy, it is crucial to maintain and further develop this potential, and there are a number of practical ways for bilateral and multilateral institutions to do so going forward.
Recommendations
First, in order to encourage more frequent and accessible talks between state representatives, diplomatic institutions can form and officially launch Digital Cooperation Councils (DCC), and adopt them as a standard practice beyond the pandemic. Digital Cooperation Councils (DCC) can include, but not be limited to, agreed-upon thematic and regional areas of cooperation that states can work on bilaterally, and even multilaterally if required. Without the need for extensive logistical planning, political discussions between diplomatic entities can then bypass outdated formalities through those councils. This would allow for more frequent talks, and open wider cooperation venues between state representatives throughout the year, and not be limited to a few pre-set official gatherings or in-person meetings.
Second, unequal access to digital connectivity should be addressed with more urgency on a global level. Multilateral institutions should prioritize this issue, and encourage global cooperation through the creation of an internationally adopted agenda for digital connectivity. The agenda can then be divided into regional action plans, with country-specific recommendations and implementation strategies. Agenda priorities should also include ways to close the gender gap when it comes to internet access, especially in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa regions. The World Bank can play a significant role in this, by providing grants to both public and private institutions in regions that need it the most. This initiative can be further supported by the United Nations as well, and lead to an eventual creation of an International Fund for Digital Accessibility.
Third, multilateral institutions can consider creating ‘virtual chairs,’ which would be reserved for underrepresented groups during negotiations. In an entirely in-person format, non-governmental stakeholders are seldom invited to participate in the diplomatic decision-making process, due to logistical limitations or security concerns. Virtual chairs would, however, allow for such stakeholders to represent their groups, and take part in relevant discussions that have a direct impact on them. One example relates to the peacebuilding processes that are discussed at institutions like the European Union. Peacekeeping discussions which concern specific countries can include virtual chairs for civil society members and non-state representatives from those countries. In this way, the use of digital diplomacy would support wider public engagement and allow for on-the-ground feedback from a wider pool of non-state actors.
Conclusion
Innovative diplomatic craftsmanship that has been encouraged by the limitations of COVID-19 must not cease in the post-pandemic era. Practitioners of diplomacy and institutions of global governance should use this opportunity to incorporate more inclusivity and accessibility in their processes and take advantage of the possibilities that the pandemic has introduced. It is important to avoid framing the issue of digital diplomacy as a black-or-white phenomenon: states neither need to create robotic representatives operated by artificial intelligence nor abandon all uses of digital spaces in diplomatic settings. However, there’s definitely no going ‘back to normal’ for diplomacy and global governance after the pandemic, and that is not a bad thing.
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The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author, and do not represent Fiker Institute.
