Conceptualizing Arab Nationalism: Theorists & The Imagined Nation
Introduction
Regional literature traces the seeds of Arab nationalism to the intellectual scene of the 19th century, when thinkers and reformers of the time sought to infuse Arabist sentiment throughout the wider society. George Antonius was one of the first scholars to offer an analytical account of the history of Arab nationalism in his influential work, Arab Awakening, published in 1938. He depicted the strings of nationalism among the Arabic-speaking population of the Ottoman Empire as an “infant” nationalism.1 The ‘center’ of this nationalism, according to distinguished historian Albert Hourani, was Syria — which then included Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. Intellectuals like Butrus Al Bustani, Nejib Azoury, and Abd Al Rahman Al Kawakibi strove to invoke Arabism while on their quests for self-perception and nation-building.2 Although their efforts encompass and advance different interpretations of Arab nationalism, these thinkers were imagining the Arab nation in an Arab World, based on shared language, history, geography, and, to some extent, even religion.
In this light, there is a tendency in existing scholarship to equate Arab nationalism to Pan-Arabism, and Arabism more broadly. Yet, conversely, each term implies a different concept. There is an agreement among experts that al-‘uruba, or Arabism, denotes Arab cultural uniformity and excludes political affiliation.3 Meanwhile, for al-qawmiyya al-Arabiyya, which translates to Arab nationalism, there are differing conceptualizations. Many scholars argue that the political unification of Arab states signifies the core meaning of Arab nationalism and that the concept itself cannot exist through independent territorial Arab states. For example, in his illuminating book, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (2016), historian Adeed Dawisha emphasizes that Arab nationalism would be a “hollow and meaningless concept if it did not strive to gather its children under one roof in one unified and sovereign Arab state.”4 On the other hand, renowned historian Rashid Khalidi argues that the term Pan-Arabism implies the political and territorial unity of Arabs, whereas Arab nationalism is a cultural concept that represents “an expression of identity and of group solidarity within the projected new format of the nation-state.”5
Scholars of the Arab World began to declare the death of Arab nationalistic concepts decades ago, with beguiling titles such as Fouad Ajami’s classic The End of Pan-Arabism (1978), Hazem Saghieh’s illuminating account Wida‘ al-‘Uruba (1999), translated to Farewell to Arabism, and Adeed Dawisha’s concluding chapter of Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century titled The Demise of Arab Nationalism: A Postmortem. Their main argument is that Arab nationalism reached the acme in the 1950s and 1960s yet, alas, in the 1970s, the political unity of Arab states proved to be an unattainable aspiration due to the sociopolitical and military setbacks of numerous Arab governments. Nevertheless, such accusation subjects Arab nationalism to geopolitical variables that further depict it as a political movement directed from modes of governance. Henceforth, such an assumption neglects the social and cultural aspects of this multilayered phenomenon.
Notwithstanding, it is beyond the scope of this essay to argue for or against the end of Arab nationalism, rather, it seeks to contextualize and conceptualize Arab nationalism as a historically situated phenomenon. This essay aims to do so through a careful reading of the paradigms introduced by the Arab World’s earliest nationalist philosophers. To note in this context, the term Arab World is adopted and refers to the Arabic-speaking map, rather than the Middle East, given the latter’s orientalist coinage. Nevertheless, by adopting such a term, this essay does not aim to exclude non-Arab communities, like the Kurds or Amazigh, of their historical and cultural bonds.
The Pioneer: Sati‘ Al Husri (1880-1968)
Sati‘ Al Husri, one of the most influential theorists of Arab nationalism, played a key role in advocating for concepts of Arabness throughout the challenging decades of the early 20th century. Al Husri, as Hourani notes, formulated “a pure theory of nationalism with all its assumptions clearly understood and accepted.”6 The core of Al Husri’s nationalistic thought emphasizes the cultural authenticity of the Arab people. For him, the main pillars of a nation are language and history through which Arab national identity can be constructed. His logic was inspired by the German Romantics, mainly philosophers Johann Gottfried von Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who wrote on cultural nationalism.7
Remarkably, Al Husri introduced the term al-‘umma al-Arabiyya, or the Arab nation, to academic and political discourse. ‘Umma as a term was widely used in the Ottoman narrative to refer to the Muslim community around the world and to emphasize religious legitimacy and identification with the Empire.8 Al Husri lived in the Ottoman Empire, working as a secondary school teacher, and was influenced further by his father’s role as a judge in the Ottoman Civil Service, thereby providing young Al Husri with insight into many parts of the Empire.9 Situated within this influence, Al Husri argued that national identification has a homogenizing power over religious identification.10 He illustrated that what makes Arabs a nation lies in shared language and history, rather than religious beliefs. In support of his ideas, Al Husri cited historical chapters wherein various groups with different national affiliations in the Balkans fought each other despite their shared religious identity. Henceforth, he emphasized that Arabness cannot be constrained by religious identity, “whether [an individual] is a Muslim or Christian; whether he is Sunni, Twelver Shi’ite or Druze […] he is a son of the Arab nation as long as he belongs to the Arab lands and speaks Arabic.”11
In Al Husri’s words, translated to English, “every single individual who belongs to the Arab countries and speaks the Arabic language is an Arab, regardless of the name of the country whose citizenship he officially holds.”12 He stressed that the shared historical experiences between members of a group interplay with their mother tongue to construct a solid sense of nationhood. Al Husri eloquently said, “Language constitutes the life of a nation [while] history constitutes its feeling. A nation which forgets its history loses its feeling and consciousness. A nation which forgets its language loses its life.”13 He went further to argue that the spiritual bond among members of the group who speak the same language and share the same memories would lead to national solidarity. This perception of spiritual solidarity is inspired by the concept of ‘asabiyya, or group feeling, developed by Ibn Khaldun, the renowned 14th-century philosopher.14 In truth, Al Husri was fascinated by Ibn Khaldun and published a book analyzing his masterpiece, Dirasa ‘an Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldun. Al Husri even named his son after Ibn Khaldun, and frequently signed his publications with the pen name Abu Khaldun, which means the father of Khaldun.15
For his entire career, Al Husri strove to construct an inclusive Arab identity that constitutes language, history, and cultural bonds. Further, he strongly believed in the significance of education, not only to empower Arab identity, but to enhance al-wa‘y al-qawmi, or national awakening.16 In fact, he obtained great opportunities to amplify his theoretical contributions through his many positions in the Ministries of Education in Damascus and Baghdad, where he designed curricula that integrated nationalist terminology.17 For Al Husri, Arab unity is the supreme goal of Arab nationalism. He regarded the post-World War II borders as artificial boundaries imposed by imperial powers. In his book al-‘Uruba Awalan, or Arabism First, Al Husri noted that he was once asked why the Arabs lost the war on Palestine in 1948 when they were seven states and Israel was only one. For him, the answer was that “the Arabs lost precisely because they were seven states.”18
The Godfather: Qustantin Zuraq (1909-2000)
Although his work seems to get little attention in Western literature, Qustantin Zurayq advanced a rich and multilayered conception of Arab nationalism that is rooted in liberal constructs. He is one of the most distinguished figures whose ideas inspired an influential generation of nationalists across the Arab World. His published volumes conceptualize Arab nationalism while attempting to balance the competing ideologies of that era. In his seminal volume al-Wa‘y al-Qawmi, which was published in 1939, Zurayq developed critical concepts including the Arab doctrine and the Arab mission, which would later dominate nationalist discourse.19 He argued that there is an Arab nation, but no nationalism. He advocated for the idea that pivotal elements that form an Arab nation do exist and that a nationalist revival is forthcoming. Thus, Zurayq explained there is an urgent need to formulate a national theory, an inclusive version of nationalism to effectively achieve collective actions.20
Interestingly, although he was trained as a historian, having graduated from Princeton University with a Ph.D. at the age of 21,21 Zurayq’s work was more focused on the future with a sense of reality and rationality. He considered history as the foundation of the Arab nation, which one should look at to draw lessons for the future.22 In his words, “national consciousness cannot be complete without understanding the nation’s past, recognizing its present, planning for its future, and envisioning its destiny.”23 However, he later argued that “historical mentalities have taken hold of us, and occupied in our thinking a higher place than they deserve. It is incumbent upon us to direct our attention – more than we have previously done, and are still doing – to the impending future so that a vision of life can be formed based on our hopes and needs.”24
Zurayq developed a more liberal model of Arab nationalism in comparison to the writers of his time. He dedicated a chapter in one of his books to highlight the integral role of Arab women in society, calling on them to carve out a more effective role in state-building.25 Moreover, Zurayq shrewdly crafted a balanced view between religion and nationalism, emphasizing that Islam, for example, is compatible with nationalism. Although he asserted that nationalism is a secular phenomenon, he explained that religion can play a moral role in the advancement of society. In the same vein, Zurayq believed that nationalism does not conflict with race, vehemently refuting the claim promoted by some Lebanese thinkers of the time who argued that their Phoenician race stands at odds with an Arab identity. He passionately wrote that “nationalism never depends on the size of a skull, or the color of skin, or the type of hair. It depends on the social and spiritual bond, which leaves a greater impact on building a nation.”26
Like Al Husri, Zurayq regarded education as a critical tool for nation-building and dedicated a lifetime to serving this end. He taught history at the American University of Beirut and served as its acting president for years, where he instituted the inaugural Arab Studies Program in 1949,27 and was a founding member of the first-ever Institute for Palestine Studies in 1963.28 It comes as no surprise that most of his students became prominent actors in the nationalist and political sphere as he was the president of a journal called al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa, translating to A Firm Bond, which was also a collective to foster intellectual debate on Arabism and anti-colonialism. This cultural society gradually transformed into a political organization aiming for independence in Damascus, Beirut, Palestine, and Baghdad.29 He later established a branch at the University of Damascus.30 In August 1948, Zurayq published a book titled Ma‘na al-Nakba, or The Meaning of Nakba, and thus introduced the term Nakba itself, meaning catastrophe, to the Arab World.31 For Zurayq, the defeat of Arab armies and the political outcome of the 1948 war embodied a critical juncture for Arabism. To him, “the defeat of the Arabs in Palestine is not a passing calamity or a simple crisis, but a catastrophe (Nakba) in every sense of the word, the worst to have befallen the Arabs in their long and challenging history.”32 Zurayq argued that the main factor behind the Nakba lies in the reactionary nature of the Arab World, and thus, he emphasized that such catastrophe should trigger a revival in the Arab nation, which is the duty of every Arab, and in particular, the intelligentsia.33
The Teacher: Michel Aflaq (1912 – 1989)
Most scholarly accounts on Michel Aflaq place the focus on his political career as the founder of the Ba‘ath Party. Although the Ba‘athist narrative has occupied the intellectual and political discourse in the Arab World for decades, such emphasis tends to neglect the theoretical framework of Aflaq and significantly limits it to a mere political instrument. For Aflaq, Arab nationalism was not only a concept, but a way of living, symbolizing love, “the same feeling that binds the individual to his/her family because the country is a household, and the nation is a large family.”34 On the other hand, he considered Arab nationalism the driving power for social change to address the ‘setbacks’ that the Arab nation suffered due to colonialism and imperialism. Aflaq’s contribution to the Arab nationalist discourse was a unique endeavor that formulated a trend of nationalism and merged contradictory ideologies under the umbrella of Arab nationalism. Throughout his life, Aflaq was on a quest to construct an Arab identity and to invoke effective change in society, as he believed that the only way for Arabs to revive the glories of the past was through ihya’, or revival, yaqaza, or awakening, and ba’ath, or resurrection. Indeed, these three terms dominated Aflaq’s writings and constitute the essence of his interpretation of Arab nationalism.
In 1929, Aflaq received a government scholarship to study history at the University of Sorbonne in Paris, which offered him the opportunity to observe sociopolitical transformation in the European societies of that era. While in Paris, Aflaq and his friends established an Arab students’ union to foster Arab solidarity and advocate for Arab independence.35 After returning to his home in Syria in the mid-30s, Aflaq worked as a high school teacher at his former school, where he preached nationalistic ideas as a means for the progress of the Arab nation. He further founded a youth group, Shabab al-Ihya’ al-‘Arabi, or Youth for Arab Revival, which consisted of politically inclined students who gathered to debate nationalistic ideals and theories about the future of the Arab ‘umma.36
Aflaq’s theoretical contributions were translated into action in 1947, one year after Syria gained independence from the French occupation, when he and his lifetime friend Salah Al Din Al Bitar founded the Ba‘ath party.37 The crux of Aflaq’s Ba‘ath doctrine is summarized in the motto he coined, “One Arab nation with an eternal mission.”38 The main ideological aim was to build one Arab state for one Arab nation. For Aflaq, the eternal Arab mission is to unite the Arabs in one sovereign entity, and convoying this mission is the ‘moral duty’ of the young Arab generation at the time.39 In Aflaq’s logic, the Arab states should ensure social justice, freedom, dignity, and equal opportunities for all individuals. Aflaq introduced Arab socialism as an integral component of Arab nationalism, as for him, socialism meant to conform with the spirit of the nation. In his words, “Arabs cannot achieve progress unless they feel and believe that their nationalism would guarantee justice, equality, and a decent standard of living for all citizens.”40 He clarified that socialism is still compatible with Arab nationalism, saying, “If I was asked to define socialism, I would not seek its definition in the texts of Marx or Lenin. I would rather say: it is the religion of life, and the triumph of life over death,” including by opening the door of employment for everyone.41 Consequently, in 1954, Aflaq merged the Ba‘ath with the Arab Socialist Party of Akram Hourani.42 By doing so, he theoretically embedded socialism as a national doctrine.
The essence of Aflaq’s ideology perceives Arab nationalism as a revolutionary force that aims to build a better future for the region, emphasizing the interconnectedness of all Arab struggles. While writing on Palestine, he explained that the question of Palestine is not different from the nationalist question in general, although it is the most important part of the latter. At this stage, almost the whole question is summarized in Palestine.43 Alas, with a series of coup d‘états, Aflaq and his philosophy of Arab nationalism were victims of the struggle for power within the establishment of the Ba‘ath party. His concepts that built the foundation of the Ba‘athist ideology were heavily manipulated by the politicians and military men who were once Aflaq’s students. The teacher was eventually ousted from Syria, and lived in Iraq for most of his final years.44
Conclusion
The so-called founding fathers of Arab nationalism spent their lives striving for integrated nation-building, and their attempts were intuitively plausible but ultimately flawed amid the political and military power struggles of their time. From the mid-21st century onward, Arab nationalism seemingly became a source of Arab division.
One century after the theorists of Arab nationalism attempted to test their hypothesis, Arabs are still puzzled over the question of their collective identity. The legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism transferred the political theater into a hotbed for competing ideologies, from regionalism to sectarianism. Although these ideologies are, to a large extent, products of their surrounding sociopolitical context, they all depend on two critical variables, external actors and security dilemmas. Ripple effects from the long-standing divide-and-rule policy adopted by foreign and colonial powers in the region continued to unfold throughout the century. This has fueled identity wars and inflamed the region’s security infrastructure, while fracturing perceptions of the collective Arab identity.
Unlike the top-down rhetoric by the nationalist intelligentsia of the early 21st century, a transborder cultural bond among members of this imagined community is reconstructed today on a horizontal approach, dominantly focused on shared language and historical context. This is even more so palpable in the digital sphere. Examples include a man in Morocco who has shown his solidarity with Syrians by launching an online fundraising campaign for victims of an earthquake in Aleppo, and a group of young women in Cairo, Beirut, and Libya who have discussed Arab sisterhood at a virtual conference. Consequently, this also continues to strengthen Arab ties in a non-institutional framework, further situating Arab nationalism today within the everyday context of cultural identity rather than political ideology.
While collective identity can be fluid, and continues to take on different forms, it cannot permanently fade away. Arab nationalism in its cultural authenticity overlaps with Arab identity in an inseparable manner, and therefore, as long as there are Arabs, there will always be ‘uruba.
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The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author, and do not represent Fiker Institute.
