Climate Justice & Historical Accountability

Introduction

In February 2022, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published its report on impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability, as part of its sixth assessment cycle.¹ Despite the IPCC having conducted research on anthropogenic climate change for over 30 years, the 2022 report marked the first time colonialism was mentioned as a driving factor of climate change by the United Nations body.² From permanent environmental degradation to unsustainable economic systems and socioeconomic inequities that exacerbate vulnerabilities to climate risks, the legacies of colonialism underpin the historical root causes of the climate crisis. As one of the leading scientific bodies that inform climate policymaking, the IPCC’s recognition of these factors signals an important advancement in the global climate justice movement.³

Grounded in the principle of equity, the movement calls for both the benefits and the risks of climate change to be distributed equally among states.⁴ Yet, countries of the Global South, as well as historically marginalized communities, are impacted the most by climate risks, even though they have contributed significantly less towards climate change. Their lack of resources, scope, and wealth to adapt to these impacts is rooted in inequalities resulting from colonial legacies. Approaching the issue of climate change through a global justice perspective helps center the needs of the most affected nations and communities in modern climate solutions. This approach involves formalizing accountability and securing compensation from countries with a history of higher emissions. Despite extensive negotiations over the past few decades, minor tangible solutions have thus far been implemented on this front. What are the current challenges facing the global climate justice movement, and what can a feasible but equitable framework for climate restitution look like?

Colonial Past, Contemporary Realities

Since the late 15^th century, colonialism was primarily driven by the commercial need to exploit natural resources.⁵ Colonies were often shaped by the time and means to maximize the extraction of these commodities. The resulting colonial practices altered native ecosystems in the Americas and in the Global South, eventually leading to severe environmental degradation.⁶ In the early 16^th century, the Spanish and Portuguese establishment of profitable sugar cane plantations in Latin America led to the clearing of millions of hectares of forest land.⁷ Similarly, forests in the Malay Peninsula were either transformed into rubber plantations or mass rice fields by the British.⁸ To facilitate extraction efforts, colonial powers often sourced their labor from local and indigenous populations. Although supported by ideologies that deemed these populations as inferior, the economic need to source cheap labor and to gain full control of their territory was instrumental in their violent dispossession. Moreover, environmental degradation was further exacerbated by the erasure of indigenous knowledge and the implementation of destructive land management practices at the time.⁹

The socioeconomic inequality between former colonies and colonial powers, the legacies of which are visible in the contemporary Global North-South divide, was dependent on three main factors: the favorable environmental conditions for successful settlements, the subjugation of native populations, and the exploitation of land and natural resources. Regions like North America offered optimal climatic conditions and a benign disease environment which were conducive to settlements. The consequent development of social, political, and economic institutions provided opportunities for settling populations, and to some extent native populations, to flourish.¹⁰ Regions that lacked these conditions, however, witnessed the establishment of “extractive institutions,” which were based on the exploitation of local and indigenous populations, as well as their natural resources.¹¹ Former “extractive” settlements had to invest heavily into recovering from the long-lasting impacts of colonialism, which continue to reduce their capacity to address contemporary concerns. As a result, these socioeconomic inequalities have made former colonies, including their institutions and populations, significantly more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

For instance, in the period between 2000 and 2019, Haiti, a former French colony, was ranked the third most affected country by weather-related loss events, such as storms, floods, and heatwaves.¹² Haiti experienced severe deforestation from the establishment of plantations on the island.¹³ The resulting degradation of natural barriers, such as forests, left Haiti more vulnerable to climate-related disasters. In 2016, Hurricane Matthew inflicted damages and losses which amounted to around 22% of the country’s gross domestic product.¹⁴ The neighboring Dominican Republic faced considerably fewer damages, which can partially be owed to their extensive tree cover.¹⁵ Moreover, the cost for Haiti to gain its independence from France has been estimated to be equivalent to $21 billion.¹⁶ In the postcolonial period, the lack of existing capital pushed the country to take out large loans with high-interest rates from American, German, and French banks.¹⁷ This debt shaped Haiti’s poverty which ultimately prevented significant investments that could have been made in adaptation measures.

Historical Carbon Emissions & Current Climate Targets

The colonial period also led to extensive amounts of air pollution, often caused by the colonial powers themselves. European colonialism coincided with the start of the Industrial Revolution in the 18th-century England.¹⁸ This period marked the use of coal and other sources of fossil fuel energy to spur the industrial and capitalist model of development, built on the foundations of industrialization, mechanization, and technological innovations. As a result, Western economic growth flourished at the expense of polluting the environment. In fact, up until the late 20^th century, Europe and North America were responsible for the greatest proportion of annual carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels.¹⁹ Nevertheless, developing countries, which have contributed significantly less to historical and, to a large extent, current emission levels, have derived the least benefits from global industrialization but remain the most vulnerable to climate risks.

The framing of climate change as a universal concern is incomplete without the acknowledgment of the Global North’s historical emissions. Despite its global nature, the impacts of climate change are context-dependent, and remain conditional to each country’s development capacities and vulnerabilities to climate threats. This inequity is partially addressed by the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capacities (CBDR-RC), outlined by Article 3(1) of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which emphasizes the common obligation, but asymmetrical responsibilities, of different countries to combat climate change.²⁰ However, a formal recognition of the historical responsibilities of developed nations was only explicitly included in the convention’s preamble. The exclusion of official acknowledgment in the plan for action, principles, and commitments allows these nations to avoid the full extent of needed action, regarding both mitigation and adaptation, that they must take to compensate for their cumulative historical emissions.

An Equitable Climate Action Framework

Climate frameworks that have been informed by the history of industrialization have also been criticized for not reflecting current realities. Under the 1992 UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, developed countries, categorized as Annex I, were committed to binding reduction targets for carbon emissions, whereas developing countries, defined as Non-Annex I, were not held to any legally binding obligations.²¹ The changing dynamics of global market economies in the 21^st century, with the rapid industrialization of countries like India and China and their resulting emissions, have initiated conversations on the outdated dichotomy implemented by these treaties. The divergence of binding commitments does not represent a fair and equitable framework to combat climate change. Despite the varying extent of action required, all countries should be upheld to committing to a binding climate action plan in line with their current socioeconomic capabilities. As such, in December 2015, the Paris Agreement moved away from the strict categorizations of Annex I and Non-Annex I countries by using the terms “developed” and “developing” countries instead.²² This allowed for a more flexible mechanism to assign responsibilities “in light of different national circumstances.”²³ As countries further grow their economies, resulting in greater emissions and improved capabilities, the share of their responsibilities will change as well. The Paris Agreement also saw a change from binding targets set for Annex I countries to self-differentiation of responsibilities through national climate action plans, referred to as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Yet, regular assessments of emission reduction pledges and policies have identified that current NDCs are not sufficient to curb catastrophic global warming.²⁴ It is important to note that, although India and China are undoubtedly two of the world’s largest emitters, statistics on total carbon emissions without adjusting for population size can misrepresent actual contributions to global emissions. In fact, calculations of per capita emissions in 2021 place both countries further down the list of biggest emitters with 8.05 and 1.93 tons of carbon dioxide per person for China and India, respectively.²⁵ This is significantly lower in comparison to developed nations in the West like the United States, which stands at 14.86 tons per person.²⁶ Moreover, with the advent of globalization, developed countries have outsourced the most polluting components of their industrial processes to the Global South, taking advantage of less stringent environmental laws and the availability of cheap labor. The products manufactured by carbon-intensive countries, such as India and China, largely serve the export markets of developed nations. For instance, China’s steel sector accounts for 17% of the country’s total carbon emissions, but it supplies over half of the world with steel.²⁷

Developed countries in the Global North have largely grown their economies and derived the most benefits through following the industrial and capitalist model of development. An analysis of carbon emissions from 1751 to 2017 shows that the United States is responsible for 25% of global historical emissions, while the European Union is responsible for 22%.²⁸ Other nations, like advanced East Asian economies such as Japan, have also benefited from this model. These countries rank high in current emission calculations, even though their historical contributions remain minimal compared to that of Western developed nations. This is not to say that the lack of historical emissions absolves the growing contributions of industrializing nations to global emissions, and releases them of the responsibility to actively transition towards renewable energy sources. However, these nuances are important to consider in building strategic frameworks for global climate resilience.

Taking Responsibility

According to the IPCC, the world must limit long-term global average temperatures to a maximum of 1.5 degrees Celsius to prevent catastrophic and irreversible anthropogenic change to the earth’s climate.²⁹ The carbon budget represents the “cumulative amount of CO₂ emissions permitted over a period of time” to meet this target.³⁰ As a result of the Global North’s historical emissions, a significant portion of the budget has already been used. This means that there is little absorptive capacity left to accommodate the emissions that will result from the increasing industrial capacities of countries in the Global South. Hence, past and present emissions by developed nations have not only been used to grow their own economies but have indirectly inhibited, and continue to inhibit, the growth of others. At the 26^th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26), a group of countries including the United States, United Kingdom, and France, pledged a blanket ban on financing any future fossil fuel projects abroad.³¹ Although consistent with their Paris Agreement pledges, this measure highlights a failure to distinguish the “survival emissions” of the poor from the “luxury emissions” of the rich in measures to reduce global carbon emissions.³² In 2019, around 760 million people, mainly concentrated in the Sub-Saharan African region, lacked access to electricity, and it is estimated that 660 million people will still live without electricity in 2030.³³ For energy inequalities where the average American citizen emits over 100 times than that of a Ugandan, large opportunities to curb emissions should be redirected to developed nations, instead of limiting the development capacities of developing nations.³⁴

Articles outlined in the 1992 Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement, call upon developed countries to provide financial resources to assist developing countries in the implementation of climate adaptation and mitigation measures. Despite having contributed the least to global emissions, historical inequities have exacerbated the vulnerabilities of developing nations to climate risks while restricting their capacity to mitigate or adapt to the impacts of climate change.

Conclusion

Financial assistance from well-endowed countries of the Global North can simultaneously alleviate the burden on low-income countries and aid in the transition to a green economy, in addition to providing a form of compensation for their historical emissions. In 2009, COP15 saw rich countries pledge $100 billion a year by 2020 to aid mitigation and adaptation measures of developing countries.³⁵ Still, the 2021 Glasgow Climate Pact noted that the goal was not yet met, and studies estimate that it will likely not be reached until late 2023.³⁶ Further research highlights that $100 billion will not be enough, and that an annual contribution of 1.6 to 3.8 trillion dollars instead would be needed to avoid exceeding average global temperatures of 1.5 degrees Celsius.³⁷

However, at the moment, the global mechanism for climate finance disbursement is inundated with structural challenges and institutional inefficiencies. Multilateral climate funds, like the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds (CIF) and the UNFCCC’s Green Climate Fund (GCF), have reported low disbursement figures for climate finance projects over the last decade.³⁸ Furthermore, studies have identified that less than 10% of climate finance committed by multilateral climate funds in 2016 was approved for locally focused projects.³⁹ Since projects, like those that relate to renewable energy infrastructure, generate returns on investment, a greater proportion of climate finance is spent on mitigation rather than adaptation.⁴⁰ Climate finance figures do not directly correspond to a meaningful impact on improving climate resilience for the most vulnerable populations in the Global South.

Most recently at the 27th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27), a landmark agreement was made to establish the Loss and Damage Fund.⁴¹ This fund will be used to address the losses and damages associated with the adverse effects of climate change in particularly vulnerable developing countries, such as rising sea levels, desertification, and extreme weather events. Despite the historically unprecedented move towards recognizing the climate justice movement, the fund does little to outline action points on the financial obligations of countries, the distributions of its responsibilities, and further administrative elements required to generate effectual impact.

This does not need to be the case going forward. These discussions must be centered in global climate dialogues, whether in annual COPs or regional gatherings regarding the climate crisis, as climate change is a phenomenon that is inextricably linked to social, political, and economic influences. Greater discourse on these nuances has highlighted the value of putting equity and inclusivity at the forefront of climate action. By encouraging actors to acknowledge and better actualize colonial accountability into contemporary systems, mechanisms, and measures that tackle climate change, bilateral and multilateral institutions will be able to advance actual tangible impact on climate resilience policies globally.

To access the works cited & endnotes, download the full report.

The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author, and do not represent Fiker Institute.